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Reproductive Selection Bias
Lauren R. Roth †
New York University School of Law
Abstract
Decades after the advent of assisted reproductive technology (“ART”)
that allows prospective parents to deselect embryos with grave genetic
illnesses—a procedure called preimplantation genetic diagnosis (“PGD”)—
it remains a tool largely of upper-class whites. I argue that the time has
come to focus on closing the access gap in this area of reproductive rights
in spite of the current political climate. If reproductive liberty is tied to
equality through access to medical procedures, scholars must finally answer
the question of what equality requires in a system that permits the use of
ARTs.
This Article shows how the current system of assisted reproduction
already distinguishes between the “in” group and the “out” group. Section
I explores the literature’s focus on the use and growth of PGD for genetic
selection unrelated to the prevention of genetic disease (“nontherapeutic
PGD”), including the use of PGD for sex and other physical-trait selection.
The scholarly overemphasis on tricky moral quandaries associated with the
nontherapeutic use of PGD where liberty concerns are at the forefront
impedes any proposed solutions to unequal access to using PGD to prevent
inherited illnesses.
Section II similarly explores how existing jurisprudence ignores the role
of income inequality and broader social concerns when deciding disputes
related to PGD. Courts address any negative implications of their decisions
for the children of those who are able to afford PGD but fail to address the
impact of their decisions on the children of those who cannot afford PGD.
Finally, I discuss in Section III how the combined effect of the Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”) antidiscrimination and essential health benefit mandates
is to focus on ensuring equality of access to healthcare, particularly for
underserved populations. While few scholars would argue today that
reproductive technology is likely to be included among the essential health
benefits the ACA requires, if the statute remains intact, it is one more
example of the troublesome class distinctions that currently divide this
country into “haves” and “have nots.” The reverse eugenics of therapeutic
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PGD privileges wealthy whites above other races and classes, and it
exacerbates race and class distinctions.
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Introduction
There are many goods and services that the poor cannot afford to buy.
From decent housing to luxury cars, from new clothes to vacations at the
beach, their unmet needs and wants are extensive. Through direct subsidies
and indirect tax credits and deductions, society tries to fill some of these
unmet needs. Grudgingly or not, completely or not, government programs
tackle needs including housing, food, and healthcare.
Given that few would argue that the government is fully meeting these
basic needs, it is unsurprising that there is currently no public funding for
advanced fertility treatments for the poor. But this is a case where a
negative right against government interference in family planning should
become a positive right to funding to create “healthy” children. 1 An
example can help demonstrate why we should be funding fertility
treatments instead of—or, ideally, in addition to—investing more in
housing or education.
Two couples, 2 the Bakers and the Smiths, are looking to conceive a child
and have an observed family history of Huntington’s disease. At the start,
1.

Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935, 946
(1996) [hereinafter Roberts I] (“Reproduction is special. Government policy
concerning reproduction has tremendous power to affect the status of entire
groups of people . . . . It is precisely the connection between reproduction and
human dignity that makes a system of procreative liberty that privileges the
wealthy and powerful particularly disturbing.”).

2.

I use two heterosexual couples in my example here. The discussion applies equally
to homosexual couples attempting to use the sperm or eggs of one member with
a genetic predisposition to an illness or chromosome abnormality.
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the disease is as prevalent among wealthy families and among poor
families. Without any additional action, they face the same risk of passing
the gene for the disease to their offspring. Unfortunately, genetic testing
reveals that Mother Baker carries the gene and will, absent medical
intervention, face a fifty-percent risk of passing that gene and the disease
itself along to her offspring because Huntington’s is a dominant gene. 3
Mother Smith also carries the Huntington’s gene and bears the same risk of
passing along the gene to her children, but she is poor and, therefore, less
likely to engage in genetic testing and discover this fact. 4
Even assuming that both families know enough about their history and
about the disease to have genetic testing done, 5 they face very different
paths forward in conceiving biological children. Although Mother Baker has
no known fertility problems, she can use in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) to
produce embryos that will then undergo preimplantation genetic diagnosis
(“PGD”). With PGD, a single cell (typically) is taken from each embryo in a
biopsy and tested to see if its DNA contains the gene for the disease. 6 By
selecting embryos without the gene—absent the small risk of human error
or other reasons for mistakenly implanting an embryo that contains the
gene for the disease—the Baker family now has a healthy baby with no risk
of developing Huntington’s disease.
3.

For a recessive gene such as cystic fibrosis (CF), a child must inherit two copies of
the gene (one from each parent who is a carrier of the gene) to manifest the
disease. The odds of two CF carriers producing a baby with the disease is 25%.
There is a 50% chance the child will be a CF carrier with one copy of the gene. CF
Genetics: The Basics, CYSTIC FIBROSIS FOUND., http://www.cff.org/What-isCF/Genetics/CF-Genetics-Basics (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). The calculation is more
complicated for genes such as BRCA1 and BRCA2 that increase the risk of several
cancers, including breast and ovarian cancer, but do not manifest in the diseases
with complete certainty. See BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing,
NAT’L
CANCER
INST.,
http://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causesprevention/genetics/brca-fact-sheet (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).

4.

See Drew Anne Scarantino, Would You Pay for Genetic Testing?, FORBES (June 13,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/learnvest/2013/06/13/would-you-pay-forgenetic-testing/#17489d9152b3; What is the Cost of Genetic Testing, And How
Long Does it Take to get the Results?, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED.,
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/costresults (last visited July 12, 2016)
(“The cost of genetic testing can range from under $100 to more than $2,000,
depending on the nature and complexity of the test.”).

5.

See, e.g., Ruqaiijah Yearby, Breaking the Cycle of “Unequal Treatment” with Health
Care Reform: Acknowledging and Addressing the Continuation of Racial Bias, 44
CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1296-1301 (2012) (discussing interpersonal racial bias and how
it “leads to racial disparities in medical treatment”).

6.

See Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis & Screening, N.Y.U. LANGONE MED. CTR.,
http://nyulangone.org/locations/fertility-center/preimplantation-geneticdiagnosis-screening (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (“Preimplantation genetic diagnosis
can identify specific genes associated with conditions such as cystic fibrosis,
hemophilia, Huntington’s disease, Marfan syndrome, muscular dystrophy,
thalassemia, Tay-Sachs disease, spinal muscular atrophy, and sickle cell anemia.”).
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The Baker family has spent a lot of money to ensure that Baby Baker is
healthy, though. 7 For that price, the Bakers no longer have to worry about
their children or their grandchildren inheriting the disease. They also save
the money needed to treat the disease and care for family members with
the disease. Although Mother Baker will one day live with Huntington’s
disease, future Baker generations will not, and they will have no reason to
lobby for research into treatments for the disease, to donate to related
charities, or even to walk in the annual event to show solidarity with others
affected by the disease. The market for future treatments will be a little
smaller by number and a lot less profitable, assuming that those most likely
to pay for expensive new treatments will no longer have the disease. 8
If, instead, all members of the two couples here are carriers of cystic
fibrosis (“CF”), which allows two healthy carriers to each pass a recessive CF
gene to a child to produce a child with CF, the Baker family can use IVF and
PGD to nearly eliminate its risk of passing CF to its offspring. The Baker
7.

See Marissa A. Mastroianni, Bridging the Gap Between the “Have” and the “HaveNots”: The ACA Prohibits Insurance Coverage Discrimination Based Upon Infertility
Status, 79 ALB. L. REV. 151, 158 (2015-16) (“An average IVF cycle in the United
States can cost between $10,000 and $15,000 with only a 25-30% live birth
success rate. Therefore, many couples will need to undergo several IVF cycles to
achieve their desired outcome.” (footnotes omitted)). Note that these figures
include only the cost of IVF and not the cost of laboratory work to engage in PGD,
substantially underestimating the cost of the process. While a number of states
require health insurance plans to cover infertility treatment, they do not discuss
the use of IVF and PGD for genetic reasons rather than infertility. In addition,
wanting to have more than one child results in completing the process multiple
times. See State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment,
NAT’L
CONF.
ST.
LEGISLATURES
(June
1,
2014)
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurance-coverage-for-infertilitylaws.aspx (“15 states—Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Rhode Island, Texas and West Virginia—have passed laws that require insurers to
either cover or offer coverage for infertility diagnosis and treatment. Thirteen
states have laws that require insurance companies to cover infertility
treatment.”).

8.

See Judith F. Daar, ART and the Search for Perfectionism: On Selecting Gender,
Genes, and Gametes, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 241, 259-60 (2005) [hereinafter Daar
I] (“If PGD has the effect of encouraging parents to avoid procreating children with
identifiable genetic disorders, it is posited that individuals who do suffer from
these gene-based diseases will face increased discrimination on three fronts. First,
a public policy that favors ridding the human race of a disease that plagues fewer
and fewer of our fellow citizens risks ‘orphaning’ the disease, that is, rarity makes
the disease, and by fiat its host, an outcast in the scientific and health
communities . . . . Affected individuals will have little hope of seeing a cure, unless
public monies are expended on behalf of furthering research in the field. Second,
individuals who are afflicted with a genetic disorder that was susceptible to
detection by PGD will likely be part of a lower socioeconomic class . . . and thus
will face further marginalization by society at large . . . . Finally, . . . [i]f an attitude
develops that ‘certain diseases can and therefore should be avoided,’ persons
born with such diseases may be perceived as culpable for their own diminished
health, further discrimination against the disabled.” (footnotes omitted)).
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family removes itself from the CF population quickly and provides no
attention or funding to the cause going forward.
The Smith family, on the other hand, faces a difficult choice. The couple
is determined to have biological children but cannot afford the cost of IVF,
let alone the cost of IVF and PGD. 9 Depending on insurance and other
resources, the Smith family can conceive naturally and then test the fetus
for Huntington’s disease via amniocentesis. Assuming the family can afford
this procedure, however, any positive test result would require terminating
the pregnancy if the family does not want to pass on the disease. For the
Smith family, producing a child without the gene might entail several failed
pregnancies.
If the Smith family conceives and does not test for the Huntington’s
gene using amniocentesis, then they have a fifty-percent chance of passing
the gene to each of their children. Since the Baker family opted out of the
disease, the Smith family now—or within a few generations, at least—faces
a world in which the wealthy do not have the disease and therefore do not
spend to research the disease and treatments or cures. Among the
population that was previously equally at risk for developing Huntington’s
disease, wealthy people now have “healthy” babies who will never develop
the disease, and poor people have “sick” babies who have a fifty percent
chance of inheriting the disease. 10
In this Article, I argue that there should be a positive right to the funding
of fertility treatments for parents with genes that can reduce their
children’s life expectancy or greatly impair their quality of life. If, at the very
moment of birth, poor children and wealthy children are not equal because
money can buy different genetic coding for length and quality of life, then
there is no hope of equality at any point thereafter. If there is no equality
at this one moment, then there is no liberty for the poor children who start
life with a stigma that the wealthy can avoid. While line drawing is always
difficult and there is a slippery slope, a negative right should become a
positive right when it is necessary to create all babies equal.

9.

Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 244 (1995) [hereinafter
Roberts II] (“The people in the United States most likely to be infertile are older,
poorer, Black, and poorly educated. Most couples who use IVF services are white,
highly educated, and affluent. New reproductive technologies are so popular in
American culture not simply because of the value placed on the genetic tie, but
because of the value placed on the white genetic tie.” (footnotes omitted)).

10.

See Judith Daar, Panel 2-Reproductive Healthcare Legislation: Where We’ve Been
and Where We’re Going, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 511, 517 (2013) (“There are also
some more nuanced arguments about orphaning certain diseases. For example, if
we were to use PGD to eliminate Down’s Syndrome, then it’s going to be the case
that not everyone can access PGD because it is expensive and not covered by
insurance. So you are going to have this sort of binary approach where people
who are wealthier and can afford PGD will not have kids with these disabilities but
people who cannot afford PGD are going to have children who do have these
genetic anomalies.”).
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Two decades after the advent of the technology that allows us to screen
out certain genetic diseases—at a time when its use is growing—we stand
at the precipice of a dramatic increase in social inequalities as a result. At
this point, we all recognize the importance (politically, if not ethically) of
reducing social inequality in this country. Scholars advocating for
reproductive liberty, or procreative liberty, as it is frequently called, have
focused on reproductive choice and allowing some to use assisted
reproductive technologies (“ARTs”). 11 Yet asserting that ARTs are morally
justified and should be legally permitted does not address the disparity in
utilization rates between classes and races. 12
Scholars, particularly Dorothy Roberts and Radhika Rao, have sought to
advance equality in reproductive liberty, but questioned at times whether
ARTs should instead be prohibited for all and genetic parentage
deemphasized. 13 I assume here, given the popularity of ARTs among those
who can afford to use them (largely wealthy whites), that it is unrealistic to
ban or substantially limit their use in the case of preventing genetic diseases
in offspring. If liberty is tied to equality, scholars must finally answer the
question of what equality requires in a system that permits the use of ARTs.
I propose that we move beyond the current discussions of morality and
legality of new ARTs because existing technology shows that we cannot
achieve reproductive equality without a positive right to government
funding. This Article details how the lack of funding for ARTs already
distinguishes between the “in” group and the “out” group—the
unfortunate other who lead supposedly lesser, wrongful lives in comparison
to those with access to ARTs. The law can and should help close the gap
11.

See Andrew B. Coan, Assisted Reproductive Equality: An Institutional Analysis, 60
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143, 1144-45 (noting that most scholars have focused on
whether constitutional protection of procreative liberty should be extended to
ARTs and “[i]f so, which ones, and in what circumstances”).

12.

Mastroianni, supra note 7, at 162 (“Secondly, the patient ‘profile’ for individuals
seeking infertility treatment is worrisome, especially because the right to
procreate is a fundamental right recognized by the United States Supreme Court.
The statistics show a positive correlation of infertility treatment usage with higher
household income and higher education levels. According to one study, ‘[t]here is
an 11 percent chance that low-income women will pursue ART, while high-income
women are almost twice as likely to do so.’ Thus, a divide between the ‘haves’ and
the ‘have-nots’ based upon these socioeconomic factors is suspect to the say the
least.” (footnotes omitted)). There is no reason to think that the utilization rates
for PGD are any higher among those with lower incomes than for IVF alone. In
fact, given the cost of PGD, there is reason to believe that the utilization rates for
IVF and PGD show greater socioeconomic disparities.

13.

Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive
Equality, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1478-79 (2008) (arguing that it would be
constitutional to ban the use of ARTs for all); Roberts I, supra note 1, at 947-49
(“Black women in particular would be better served by a focus on the basic
improvement of conditions that lead to infertility , such as occupational and
environmental hazards, diseases, and complications following childbirth and
abortion.”).
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under the ACA, 14 particularly given that reverse eugenics privileges the
wealthy and disproportionately white above other races and classes. I use
PGD here as a lens to focus on ARTs more generally.
Section I of this Article will explore the literature’s focus on the use and
growth of PGD for genetic selection unrelated to the prevention of genetic
disease (“nontherapeutic PGD”), including the use of PGD for sex and other
physical-trait selection. Given that most people cannot afford the more
urgently needed therapeutic use of PGD (about which there are fewer
moral and legal concerns), the scholarly emphasis on the nontherapeutic
use of PGD and novel challenges to reproductive liberty is misplaced. In fact,
the overemphasis on tricky moral quandaries associated with the
nontherapeutic use of PGD, where liberty concerns are at the forefront,
impedes any proposed solutions to unequal access to using PGD to prevent
grave, inherited illnesses. I argue that liberty is intertwined with equity
where it produces “sick” children who could otherwise be born “healthy.”
A negative right becomes a positive right to funding for ARTs where poor
children will otherwise suffer illness and social stigma that is preventable
before birth.
Section II explores how existing jurisprudence ignores the role of
income inequality and broader social concerns in deciding disputes related
to PGD. Courts have slowly begun to resolve the disputes that arise when
the use of PGD for the prevention of genetic disease goes awry, including
custody disputes over embryos. A growing body of literature addresses the
use of a tort law claim for wrongful life when a doctor or lab’s mistake
results in the conception of a baby with a genetic disease that could have
been prevented absent negligence. More enthralled with this tort theory
than are the courts, scholars have largely overlooked the implications that
any successful wrongful life claims would have for those without access to
therapeutic PGD. In family law disputes over custody of embryos, the
weight courts have placed on having a healthy, genetic child again
advantages those who can afford therapeutic PGD and stigmatizes those
who cannot.
I argue in Section III that equal access to PGD and to all ARTs is more
important than ever because of the likelihood that key pieces of the ACA
will be repealed. If Congress and the President repeal the ACA’s individual
mandate, it will make the popular provision that prevents insurance plans
from rejecting individuals with pre-existing medical conditions or charging
them higher premiums difficult to maintain as young, healthy consumers
opt out of health insurance. 15 The ACA’s mandates can help bridge the gap
14.

Health Care and Education and Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (jointly “ACA”).

15.

See Margot Sanger-Katz, Why Keeping Only the Popular Parts of Obamacare Won’t
TIMES
(Nov.
15,
2016),
Work,
N.Y.
http://www.mobile.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/upshot/why-keeping-only-thepopular-parts-of-obamacare-wont-work.html?_r=0 (discussing inevitable cycle of
increasing premiums and decreasing enrollment in insurance markets that
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between classes and between the healthy and the sick. Section 1557 of the
ACA prohibits discrimination in health insurance on the basis of health
status, race, and sex. 16 In addition, the ACA requires the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to “take into account the health care needs of diverse
segments of the population, including women, children, persons with
disabilities, and other groups” when defining essential health benefits
(“EHBs”). 17 The combined effect of these mandates is to focus on ensuring
equality of access to healthcare for all, particularly underserved
populations. Reproductive technology should be a key area in the
discussion of how to define EHBs, and the illustration of therapeutic PGD
demonstrates why. There is an administrative law solution that creates
healthy children who society does not stigmatize because of their
preventable genetic conditions, assuming the ACA—or at least its goals—
remain intact.

I.

Using PGD to Select Babies

Courts have broadly affirmed the right to procreate and the right to be
free from government intervention into personal matters, including the
bearing of a child (a negative right). 18 Scholars have moved down the
prohibit discrimination against those with pre-existing conditions but do not have
an individual mandate forcing the young and healthy to buy insurance).
16.

PPACA § 1557 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18116) (“Except as otherwise provided for
in this title . . . an individual shall not, on the ground prohibited under title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975
(42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C.
794), be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under, any health program or activity, any part of which is
receiving Federal financial assistance, including credits, subsidies, or contracts of
insurance, or under any program or activity that is administered by an Executive
Agency or any entity established under this title (or amendments).”).

17.

Id. at § 1302(b)(4)(C) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(C)).

18.

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overturning Bowers v. Hardwick
and finding a due process violation where a statute prohibited same-sex sexual
acts because “[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual”); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 (1992) (striking down
requirement that women seeking abortions certify that they have notified the
father of the fetus prior to obtaining an abortion because of the “far greater
impact on the mother’s liberty than on the father’s” and noting that “the State
has touched not only upon the private sphere of the family but upon the very
bodily integrity of the pregnant woman”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)
(striking down under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a
statute criminalizing abortion but noting that the State’s interests in regulating
abortion becomes “compelling” at viability); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972) (striking down Massachusetts ban on the distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried individuals under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
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slippery slope to test this right in the face of new technologies that permit
or will soon permit would-be parents to select offspring with desired traits
and even manipulate the DNA of embryos to design their own children. 19 If
couples can use PGD to avoid passing certain genes on to their children, 20 a
so-called “procreative liberty” may allow parents to use PGD to choose their
children’s sex, physical appearance, or even sexual orientation simply as a
matter of preference. 21 John Robertson argues that income disparities,
which make this new technology inaccessible to some, should not interfere
with the right of others to procreate using these methods. 22 As he has made
clear for decades in his research and states in Children of Choice: Freedom
and the New Reproductive Technologies:
One can decry the disparities that exist and urge that society correct
distributive inequities, however, without denying all persons the right to
make these choices. In the end, the need for social justice is not a
compelling reason for limiting the procreative choice of those who can
pay. 23
Over the years, scholars including Dorothy Roberts and Radhika Rao
have pushed to bring equality forward in the debate about ARTs. 24 Some
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (citing the
constitutional “zone of privacy” surrounding the marital relationship when
refusing to enforce a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives).
19.

John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. & MED.
439, 442 (2003) [hereinafter Robertson I] (“A central dilemma is that accepting
any instance of genetic selection in principle implies accepting most other
instances of selection as well. But some uses seem much more questionable and
less beneficial than the one initially accepted. Can acceptable lines be drawn, or is
it better, as some would argue, to permit little, if any, genetic selection to
occur?”).

20.

JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 162 (1994) [hereinafter Robertson II] (“Assuming safety and efficacy,
the main objections to therapeutic interventions on embryos are effects on the
gene pool and later generations and slippery slope fears that it will lead to more
dangerous interventions. However, neither harm is sufficiently weighty to deny
parents this path to healthy offspring.”).

21.

See id. at 4 (“To deny procreative choice is to deny or impose a crucial self-defining
experience, thus denying persons respect and dignity at the most basic level.”).

22.

Id. at 225-26 (“Yet it does not follow that society’s failure to assure access to
reproductive technologies for all who would benefit justifies denying access to
those who have the means to pay. Such a principle has not been followed with
other medical procedures, even life-saving procedures such as heart transplants.
As troubled as we might be by differential access, the demands of equality should
not bar access for those fortunate enough to have the means.”).

23.

Id. at 227 (“It is another example of the disparities that differential distribution of
wealth in a liberal society inevitably bring.”).

24.

See MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN & JEFFREY R. BOTKIN, ACCESS TO THE GENOME: THE CHALLENGE TO
EQUALITY (1998); Rao, supra note 13; Roberts I, supra note 1, at 939.
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have moved for an emphasis on equality in place of liberty, 25 while others
have asserted that these constitutional rights are not binary and instead
liberty requires equal access to ARTs. 26 In this Section, I argue that
procreative liberty requires equal access and, therefore, a positive right to
funding for therapeutic PGD where children will otherwise have a reduced
life expectancy or significantly impaired quality of life as a result of genetic
illness or chromosome abnormality. 27 I discuss the implications of this
argument on the liberty and equality rights of the disabled. It is the addition
of the child’s liberty to be free of preventable illness to the mother’s
reproductive liberty to procreate in the manner she chooses that results in
a positive right to funding for therapeutic PGD, despite a worrisome impact
on the lives of the disabled.
A.

The Tension Between Liberty and Equality

The introduction of PGD in the 1980s was a dramatic advance in
reproductive medicine and the study of genetics, since physicians could
analyze the genetic makeup of embryos and make decisions about which
embryos to implant into a woman seeking to become pregnant. 28 One main
benefit is that, in many cases, a woman no longer needs to conduct tests to
determine the embryo’s health after implantation and possibly abort that
fetus. 29
The PGD procedure begins with the couple undergoing IVF. The IVF
process requires multiple steps: (1) medical suppression of the woman’s
menstrual cycle, (2) medical stimulation of the woman’s ovaries to produce
multiple eggs, (3) retrieval of the eggs, (4) collection of sperm from the man,
and (5) combination of the sperm and eggs in the laboratory. 30 After these
25.

See, e.g., Roberts I, supra note 1, at 939; Roberts II, supra note 9.

26.

See, e.g., Jessica Knouse, Reconciling Liberty and Equality in the Debate over
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 107; Rao, supra note 13.

27.

Beyond questions of liberty and equality, scholars express concerns that
nontherapeutic PGD gives parents too much control over their children and may
harm them through expectations. Selecting embryos is a “highly instrumental
approach to reproduction [that] . . . could lead to viewing children as
commodities, and undermine their inherent worth and dignity.” John A.
Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV. 421, 423
(1996) [hereinafter Robertson III].

28.

Daar I, supra note 8, at 247-48 (“Perhaps the most important development in
reproductive medicine since the introduction of IVF is a technique known as
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).”).

29.

Id. at 248 (“The ability to select genetically healthy embryos for transfer into a
woman’s uterus may reduce the number of elective abortions performed, but the
use of PGD has not reduced the controversy that swirls around the medicalization
of early life.” (footnotes omitted)).

30.

Embryo Screening Procedures, PENN MED., https://www.pennmedicine.org/forpatients-and-visitors/find-a-program-or-service/penn-fertility-care/embryoscreening/treatments-and-procedures (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
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steps are completed and the eggs and sperm have combined to produce
embryos, the PGD process begins.
Once the embryo has been cultivated in the laboratory for three days,
an embryo biopsy is performed. 31 At this stage, “[t]he embryos are typically
eight-cell embryos . . . and the process involves the removal of one to two
cells.” 32 The biopsied cells are then analyzed using one of two techniques,
depending on what the couple is interested in testing for—heritable genetic
disorders or chromosomal abnormalities. 33 Once the results are received,
the “embryo(s) of the best quality that are not affected by the genetic
disorder or chromosomal abnormality) [sic] are selected for transfer to the
uterus . . . following two additional days of culture in the laboratory.” 34
Alternatively, the biopsy of the embryo can be completed after either
five or six days of cultivation, at which point “the embryo consists of many
cells and . . . [c]ells are removed from the outer layer of cells.” 35 After
biopsy, all of the embryos with no chromosome abnormalities that are still
viable for implantation are frozen. 36 The same tests are performed on the
biopsied cells. Once the results come in, “non-affected or chromosomally
normal [embryos] are thawed and transferred” to the uterus. 37
For both biopsy techniques, if, after the transfer of certain embryos to
the uterus, “additional unaffected and good-quality embryos are available,
they may be cryopreserved for future embryo transfer.” 38 Those embryos
that are affected or that present chromosomal abnormalities are either
discarded or donated for use in scientific research. 39 As of 2014, PGD was

31.

Id.

32.

Id.

33.

Id. (explaining that during these tests the biopsied cells are destroyed “and can’t
be used for another purpose or returned to the embryo.”).

34.

Id.

35.

Id.

36.

Id.

37.

Id.

38.

Id.

39.

See Kathryn Ehrich et al., The Embryo as Moral Work Object: PGD/IVF Staff Views
and Experiences, 30 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 772 (2008).
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utilized in approximately 19,000 IVF cycles. 40 Of those, PGD for
nontherapeutic purposes was used in approximately 1700 cycles. 41
Currently, PGD can be used for medical selection (to discard embryos
with chromosomal abnormalities or genetic mutations that increase the
likelihood of a disease in favor of healthy embryos) and sex selection
(sometimes used to discard embryos with a sex-linked genetic disease but
more often to select sex based on parental preference). While trait
selection (selection based on the embryo’s physical traits, such as height,
eye color, or intelligence) is not yet possible, it dominates the academic
debates over the wisdom and ethics of using PGD to select embryos. 42
In addition to helping parents create healthier babies without genes for
inherited diseases, PGD may soon allow parents to choose which embryos
to implant based on the embryo’s “eye color, hair color, skin color, sex, and
even ‘disabilities.’” 43 In the United States, there is little regulation of such
nontherapeutic applications of PGD. 44 There are few measures of the
demand for nontherapeutic use of PGD (which likely exceeds current
technology), although historical demand for favored traits can be shown
through favoritism for male children and a preference for children with
certain physical traits. 45
40.

National
Summary
Report,
SOC’Y
ASSISTED
REPROD.
TECH.,
https://www.sartcorsonline.com/rptCSR_PublicMultYear.aspx?ClinicPKID=0
(follow “FILTER” in upper-right-hand corner, select “INCLUDE ONLY” for “PGD/PGS”)
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017). What Is SART?, SOC’Y ASSISTED REPROD. TECH.,
http://www.sart.org/patients/what-is-sart/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (noting that
in recent years the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (“SART”) has
collected information from its members regarding IVF cycles and the outcomes of
those cycles; SART consists of 90% of ART clinics in the United States).

41.

See Harvey J. Stern, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Prenatal Testing for
Embryos Finally Achieving Its Potential, 3 J. CLINICAL MED. 280, 284 (2014) (“Of all
PGD cycles reported in 2005, non-medical sex selection was performed in 9% of
cases.” (footnote omitted)). This number was reached by utilizing the 9% figure
posited by Harvey Stern, and multiplying that number by the SART number of IVF
procedures that utilized PGD.

42.

Daar I, supra note 8, at 250-51.

43.

See Knouse, supra note 26, at 109 (citation omitted).

44.

Id. at 109, 121 (“Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately categorize
the various tests, some are considered therapeutic while others are considered
nontherapeutic. Therapeutic tests are commonly used to detect single gene
disorders such as cystic fibrosis, Tay-Sachs, and sickle cell anemia, as well as
chromosomal abnormalities such as Down syndrome and Turner syndrome.”
(footnotes omitted)).

45.

Id. at 118-20 (“Throughout history, at least some prospective parents have
wanted to select the attributes of their prospective children--sometimes out of a
desire to maximize their social status and opportunity and sometimes out of a
desire to reproduce themselves. Some prospective parents in patriarchal societies
have wanted male children; some in racially stratified societies have wanted
blond-haired, blue-eyed, light-skinned children . . . . While prospective parents
have always been able to make general choices about their children’s attributes
through ‘eugenic dating’ (and, since the 1960s, through the use of donor
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It is easy to imagine what complications could arise if parents begin to
implant only male embryos in large numbers, for example. 46 Not only would
a stigma eventually develop against female children, but there could be
long-term consequences for marriage and birth rates reminiscent of
problems resulting from China’s one-child policy and the use of lessadvanced methods to select male children. 47 Similarly, selecting embryos
based on hair color and eye color would inevitably stigmatize the lessfavored characteristics, particularly as their incidence in the population
declined.
The literature debating the wisdom of regulating nontherapeutic uses
of PGD—and ARTs more generally—addresses the supposed conflict
between the liberty right of parents to be free from government intrusion
into procreation and childbearing and the issue of equality, since not
everyone has access to this procedure, but focuses largely on the
importance of valuing liberty over equality. 48

material), they could not, until the 1970s, make specific choices about their
children’s attributes.” (footnotes omitted)).
46.

I note here, however, that selecting embryos for sex can be therapeutic because
some genetic diseases are either only present in one sex or are more prevalent
among people of that sex. See id. at 121 (“Testing for sex has therapeutic
relevance in that it can prevent X-linked diseases such as hemophilia, as well as
nontherapeutic (social) relevance for prospective parents who want a child of a
given sex.” (footnotes omitted)).

47.

But see Daar I, supra note 8, at 265-71 (arguing against banning PGD to select sex
of embryos because it restricts reproductive freedom “in the name of preventing
an uncertain harm to others”).

48.

See Knouse, supra note 26, at 109-10. Some professors argue that the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the use of PGD for
nontherapeutic reasons. The theory underlying all of the reproductive rights
cases, see supra note 16, is that an individual has a right to decide whether to bear
or beget a child. Based on this theory, PGD would seem to be protected as an
integral part of that right. This is true whether an individual is using PGD to decide
whether to have a child with a disability or not or whether to have a child with a
certain eye color or not. Additionally, given how early PGD occurs in the
pregnancy, the government’s compelling interest in the potentiality of human life
would seem to be very low (failing the undue burden standard utilized in abortion
cases such as Casey). The difference between non-therapeutic and therapeutic
seems more relevant when looking at the undue burden standard, however.
Forcing an individual to decide between having a child with a disability or not
having a biological child would likely be considered an undue burden on a person’s
right to bear or beget a child. It would also be hard to argue that therapeutic PGD
is not protected because the procedure is focused on the health of the potential
human life. The reason the government has any power to restrict the right to
abortion is that it has a compelling interest in the health of the mother or the
potentiality of human life. On the other hand, forcing an individual to decide
between having a child with a certain eye color or not having a biological child
likely would not be viewed as an undue burden. Finally, the Court has held in
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), that completely restricting access to a
certain type of abortion is not unconstitutional as long as there is another
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Robertson defines procreative liberty as “the freedom to decide
whether or not to have offspring.” 49 According to Robertson, this “deeply
held moral and legal value” mandates that the government will almost
never have sufficient reason for limiting use of reproductive technology. 50
This “negative right” is “first and foremost an individual interest,” and does
not imply a duty to fund those who cannot afford to exercise this liberty. 51
Robertson believes that procreative liberty should prevent government
regulation of nontherapeutic PGD, although he terms the use of embryo
selection “quality control.” 52 He asserts that the tie between offspring’s
traits and the decision to reproduce, which is protected by the courts,
argues in favor of a procreative liberty that encompasses genetic selection
and even genetic alteration of embryos where the ability to determine the
offspring’s traits affects the decision to reproduce or not to reproduce. 53
Although Robertson concedes that wealth disparities that prevent
uniform access to technologies such as PGD are troubling, his focus is on
the importance of parents’ liberty to decide when and how to procreate. 54
As he says, this healthcare problem applies more broadly than in
reproduction—”the rich get the benefits, the poor get a few crumbs or
procedure that can be used. It would seem then that the Court might allow
nontherapeutic PGD to be banned without banning therapeutic PGD.
49.

Robertson II, supra note 20, at 3-4.

50.

Id. at 4, 16 (“I propose that procreative liberty be given presumptive priority in all
conflicts, with the burden on opponents of any particular technique to show that
harmful effects from its use justify limiting procreative choice.”).

51.

Id. at 22-23 (“The exercise of procreative liberty may be severely constrained by
social and economic circumstances. Access to medical care, child care,
employment, housing, and other services may significantly affect whether one is
able to exercise procreative liberty. However, the state presently has no
constitutional obligation to provide those services. Whether the state should
alleviate those conditions is a separate issue of social justice.”). But see Cass R.
Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 889 (1987) (“Viewed through
the lens of the Lochner period, claims for ‘positive rights’ cannot be dismissed by
reference to the ‘negative’ character of constitutional guarantees or the word
‘deprive’ in the in the fourteenth amendment. Whether there is a deprivation
depends on antecedent conceptions of entitlement; if there were a pre-existing
right to welfare, the failure to provide it would in fact be a deprivation.”).

52.

Robertson II, supra note 20, at 150-51 (“The term ‘quality control’ sounds
perjorative [sic], but it is the parents’ interest in healthy offspring that has spurred
these developments.”).

53.

Robertson III, supra note 27, at 425-27 (“Because reproductive events have such
personal significance and impact, the decision whether or not to reproduce should
clearly be within an individual’s personal discretion.” (footnote omitted)).
Unsurprisingly based on his argument, Robertson includes within this category of
procreative liberty, the use of ART to prevent passing on late-onset genetic
diseases such as Huntington’s disease, polycystic kidney disease, and Alzheimer’s
disease, as well as genes that make offspring more likely to inherit diseases such
as cancer, heart disease, and even bipolar disorder. Id. at 433.

54.

Robertson II, supra note 20, at 14.
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nothing” 55—but he does not believe that issues of wealth inequality should
interfere with access to ARTs for those who can afford them. 56 While many
scholars have critiqued his theory of procreative liberty in the decades since
he developed it, 57 fewer scholars have focused on addressing his admission
that “[a]llocating reproductive technologies and other essential goods and
services according to ability to pay raises profound questions of social
justice.” 58
For an individual to access the technologies, (1) there must be a
sufficient supply to meet the demand, (2) that individual must have the
funds to pay for the services, and (3) the person must know about the
technologies and “know to ask for them.” 59 While many fear that this
country’s history of eugenics will result in the use of ARTs to “fix” the gene
pool by pushing for their use on the poor, 60 equally troubling is the
predominant use of the technologies by the wealthy to increase their
already-existing social advantages by selecting offspring with desirable
traits. 61 Disability rights advocates and other scholars emphasize that the
inability of many to afford technologies such as PGD could result in a genetic

55.

Id.

56.

Id. at 15 (“Discrimination by wealth, however, seems inevitable if reproductive
technologies are to be available at all. While some persons would argue that
access to reproductive technology should be a mandated benefit in any health
insurance program, the high cost of universal health care for the uninsured makes
it unlikely that most reproductive technologies will be covered. Other than
contraception, abortion, and some prenatal screening, it is likely that access to
most reproductive technologies will remain dependent on wealth.”).

57.

See, e.g., Gilbert Meilaender, Products of the Will: Robertson’s Children of Choice,
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173 (1995); Laura M. Purdy, Children of Choice: Whose
Children? At What Cost?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 197, 198 (1995) (asserting that
most feminists “will also be critical of the individualistic stream that runs through
his work, as it favors those with more power and disadvantages those who, like
white women and people of color, tend to have less”).

58.

Robertson II, supra note 20, at 225-26 (“A major problem with a rights-based
approach is that it ignores the social and economic context in which exercise of
rights is embedded.”).

59.

MEHLMAN & BOTKIN, supra note 24, at 55.

60.

Id. at 61 (“Eugenics advocates who see genetic technologies as a way to ‘perfect’
the human gene pool might push for allocation policies that favor persons with
relatively poor genetic endowments. These policies also might appeal to liberals
as a means of rectifying gross disparities of social status by giving persons of low
status access to genetic enhancements that promote upward social mobility.”).

61.

Id. (“[S]ome people may prefer to reserve scarce genetic resources for those who
are gifted with superior genes, on the theory that they would make the best use
of them, thereby yielding the greatest amount of social good.”).
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arms race that will leave the poor and disabled farther behind. 62 These fears
lead to calls for regulation of ARTs. 63
The problem with relying on the public’s willingness to pay to allocate
access to ARTs is that it assumes that individuals have roughly similar wealth
and that goods should then be divided based on how strong consumer
demand for a particular good is. But wealth disparities undermine this
analysis. 64 It looks like an even worse way to allocate access to genetic
selection technologies when one factors in that some have a greater need
for access to those services, such as a family history of a grave, genetic
illness. 65
Scholars who have focused on equality in reproductive rights fear that
creating a positive right to ARTs will result in government coercion and a
lack of meaningful choice due to pressure to use the technology. 66 Several
scholars have therefore proposed limiting the use of ARTs to ensure
equality, instead of expanding access. Radhika Rao discusses the “intimate
relationship between liberty and equality [that] suggests that courts should
strive to ensure equal liberty: limits upon individual liberty and autonomy
should be meted out with a measure of equality.” 67 She puts forth a theory
62.

Rao, supra note 13, at 1467-68.

63.

Id. at 1474 (“Hence, all persons must possess an equal right, even if no one retains
an absolute right, to use ARTs.”). Many argue that ARTs aggravate inequality by
focusing on the female role to reproduce and by emphasizing genetics to advance
racist, sexist, and classist prejudices.

64.

MEHLMAN & BOTKIN, supra note 24, at 89 (“But willingness to pay runs into a
fundamental problem. It might be a satisfactory and perhaps even superior way
of allocating access to genetic technologies so long as individuals are able to afford
the technologies they desire. Part of what economists who advocate willingnessto-pay approaches mean when they assume that ‘all other things are equal’ is that
everyone has roughly the same amount of wealth. But . . . as we know from
personal experience, this clearly is not the case.”).

65.

Id. (“Another assumption that economists make is that everyone has the same
basic needs for the desired goods, for example, the same risk factors that cause
them to need genetic technologies. But this assumption is false . . . . As Richard
Epstein . . . points out, ability to pay does not correlate well with medical need.”).

66.

See, e.g., Roberts I, supra note 1, at 947-49 (discussing the impact that law and
social structures have had on black reproduction and stating that social justice
may require that government “reallocate resources away from expensive
reproductive technologies”).

67.

Rao, supra note 13, at 1488. The same privacy cases that those favoring
reproductive liberty cite to prevent government interference with the right to
procreate or not to procreate can be viewed as advocating for equality since they
helped women control their reproductive years, their ability to work, and their
bodies. Indeed, the cases that are the foundation of a constitutional right to
privacy overturn laws that distinguish between different races and classes. Id. at
1466-67 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma – striking down law permitting sterilization of
chicken thieves but not embezzlers, Meyer v. Nebraska – striking down law
prohibiting foreign language instruction in schools, Pierce v. Society of Sisters –
striking down law requiring public school attendance, Loving v. Virginia – striking
down law banning interracial marriage, Zablocki v. Redhail – striking down law
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of equal liberty, or reproductive liberty, that permits the government to
prohibit or limit different ARTs but does not allow distinctions “based upon
the status of the persons involved.” 68 Only laws that allow all to use ARTs,
including sexual minorities and the unmarried for example, would be
constitutional. 69 Banning therapeutic or nontherapeutic PGD is
constitutional under Rao’s framework. 70
Dorothy Roberts more strongly advocates limiting the use of ARTs. The
correlation between race and socioeconomic status means that race plays
a large role in any discussion of equality in the use of ARTs. Even the
supposedly noble goal of therapeutic PGD must still contend with the
notion that many of the poor (more likely to be minorities) do not place the
same value on genetic ties and should not be coerced into using ARTs when
other options, such as not having children, using sperm donors, or adopting
children, are available. As Roberts writes, “I have also noticed that America
is obsessed with creating and preserving white genetic ties. Trading the
genetic tie on the market lays bare the high value placed on whiteness and
the worthlessness accorded blackness.” 71 Given the high price of racial
discrimination in the United States, the potential for parents to manipulate
genes to alter the race of embryos is not speculative. Roberts questions
whether limiting the use of ARTs sacrifices too much liberty on the altar of
equality, but in the end, believes that imposing such limits is the best
solution to issues of modern reproduction and inequality. 72
Other solutions scholars propose focus on equality, including using the
money that is saved by avoiding genetic diseases to fund increased ART

requiring court approval prior to marriage for any individual with an outstanding
child support obligation, and Lawrence v. Texas – striking down law prohibiting
same-sex sodomy).
68.

Id. at 1460 (“Why provide equal but not absolute rights in the realm of assisted
reproduction? The principle of reproductive liberty has no logical stopping point;
it confers constitutional protection upon almost every technology that is
necessary to procreation . . . . It subjects all laws that restrict reproductive
autonomy to strict judicial scrutiny and requires them to be struck down unless
necessary to advance compelling governmental objectives.” (footnotes omitted));
cf. Andrew B. Coan, Assisted Reproductive Equality: An Institutional Analysis, 60
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143 (2010) (calling for additional comparative institutional
analysis of Rao’s proposal).

69.

Rao, supra note 13, at 1460.

70.

Id. at 1482.

71.

Roberts II, supra note 9, at 210-11 (arguing that the genetic tie is not based on
biology but instead a method “that promotes racist and patriarchal norms”).
Roberts finds that the most socially significant genetic link between parents and
child is race. Id. at 223.

72.

Roberts I, supra note 1, at 948-49. Roberts supports equal access to ARTs through
government subsidies and legislation requiring their inclusion in private insurance
coverage, although she believes the use of ARTs ultimately should be restricted.
Id. at 946-47.
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use, 73 mandating insurance coverage for technology use, 74 providing
assistance to those with greater needs for the technology through charity, 75
and even using genetic lotteries. 76 Most proposed solutions focus on
therapeutic PGD and not nontherapeutic PGD. 77 Jessica Knouse, however,
proposes subsidizing nontherapeutic PGD as one solution that promotes
both liberty and equality. 78 Given the demand for services that would likely
result if subsidies for nontherapeutic PGD were large enough to rectify
equality concerns, however, this proposal would be a very costly one.
B.

Liberty for the Disabled

Any proposal to fund PGD use to screen out genetic illness or
chromosomal abnormalities impacts the disabled. Many of those with
disabilities view themselves as subject to an unfair social stigma rather than
burdened by their disabilities. 79 Efforts to deselect embryos for disabilities
can be seen as a failure to understand the value of the lives of the disabled.
73.

MEHLMAN & BOTKIN, supra note 24, at 105-06 (“The problem is that, surprising as it
may sound, it simply is not clear that preventing illness saves money. No doubt it
may reduce the costs of acute care in the short run, but in the long run, the people
who would have died from acute ailments would go on to live longer and to
contract the expensive, chronic illnesses of old age.”). This point, however,
excludes the many additional years of insurance premium payments that
companies would collect along the way.

74.

Id. at 107 (“The only technologies that might be excluded from coverage due to
cost would be those that were expected to yield only trivial benefits . . . .
However, this assumes that we could define which benefits were trivial.”).

75.

Id. at 111 (“If organized charities stepped in to finance access to genetic
technologies, they might well allocate their funds on the basis of judgments about
the recipients’ character, or their social worth, or on the basis of their religion or
ethnicity, all of which might raise complaints of favoritism and unfairness that
could lead to government intervention.”).

76.

See id. at ch. 7.

77.

But see JUDITH DAAR, THE NEW EUGENICS: SELECTIVE BREEDING IN AN ERA OF REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 193-95 (2017) [hereinafter Daar II] (calling for broad increases in
insurance coverage, “reduced-cost treatment strategies”, and additional
charitable provision for ART to make it more accessible to those who cannot afford
it).

78.

Knouse, supra note 26, at 152 (“This is not to say that subsidies are unequivocally
the best policy, simply that they appear most likely to enable the expression of
genetic and ideological diversity. If future studies revealed that this was not
accurate--because prospective parents were, for example, consistently selecting
against given eye, hair, and skin colors, or against a given sex--reassessment would
of course be required.”).

79.

See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Life, Death, and Choice, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER
425, 435-36 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos I] (noting that many disability rights
advocates view the “greatest suffering of people with disabilities [as] the socially
stigmatized identity inflicted upon them” and argue that the solution is not to
treat or eliminate disabilities but instead to eliminate the stigma and stop
devaluing disabled lives (internal footnotes omitted)).
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In addition, funding for therapeutic PGD may create pressure to deselect
embryos because doing so is what the government and society believe is
right. As the number of disabled people decreases, the social stigma of
being different is likely to increase. While the amount of resources spent to
aid the disabled may not necessarily decrease, the community will be
smaller, and views of the disabled will be different, because of efforts to
screen out genetic illness and resulting disabilities.
Although I discuss these implications of my argument below in Section
III, here I address the main focus of the health law literature in addressing
liberty for the disabled—the small percentage of parents who seek to use
PGD to produce children with traits that many consider to be disabilities,
such as deafness or dwarfism. The fact that this is the topic that dominates
discussions of reproductive rights with ARTs and the disabled shows the
extent to which liberty still dominates equality in the literature on ARTs and
also the implications for the disabled of any positive right to PGD. Some
disabled parents want to bring children into a culture that is an integral part
of their lives, 80 but health law scholars have been largely critical and coined
the phrase “intentional diminishment.” 81
My focus here is on how the ability to eliminate disabilities through
methods such as therapeutic PGD creates an “in” group and “out” group.
Given that the “out” group already struggles with feeling different and
isolated, further use of ARTs by wealthy whites will only enhance the idea
of two genetic classes: those with healthy or better genes and those
without, the healthy babies and the sick babies.
Under Robertson’s procreative liberty framework, the decision to
reproduce could be fundamentally affected by whether a couple can have
a child who is deaf or has a form of dwarfism, leading to the conclusion that
PGD to intentionally produce a child with a disability should be permitted
under the law. Here, however, the liberty runs up against a demonstration
of “tangible harm to others [that] would justify restriction.” 82 Families who
80.

See Darshak M. Sanghavi, Wanting Babies Like Themselves, Some Parents Choose
TIMES
(Dec.
5,
2006),
Genetic
Defects,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/05/health/05essa.html?_r=0 (“Traditionally,
cultures were perpetuated through assortative mating, with intermarriage among
the like-minded and the like-appearing. Modern technology has been adopted for
this purpose . . . .”).

81.

See I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem, and Legal
Liability, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 349 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen I] (“While Smolensky
discusses creating ‘children with disabilities,’ I will from here on out use the phrase
‘intentional diminishment,’ which I will define as intentionally using reproductive
technology to produce a child who is on balance significantly harmed as compared
to the ‘normal’ child (think of ‘diminishment’ as the antonymic concept to
‘enhancement,’ which is often discussed in the bioethics literature).”).

82.

Robertson III, supra note 28, at 439. Robertson believes that ignoring genetic test
results (whether the testing is mandatory or voluntary) and producing
“unavoidably handicapped offspring” does not harm the children because there is
no other outcome possible. Robertson says there is “in most cases no wrongful
life.” He continues, “As long as persons who choose to ignore genetic information
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believe that being a member of the deaf community, for example, is
beneficial to a child would dispute the notion that being deaf is harmful to
a child or argue that this harm is balanced by the benefits of participation
in a vibrant and cohesive community. Scholars have largely opposed the use
of PGD and other ARTs to produce disabled children, however. 83
The health law literature’s focus on the use of ARTs to affirmatively
produce children with disabilities is a response to claims that reproductive
technology will result in a modern form of eugenics and a desire by some
to prevent forced genetic selection. From the late 1880s to the early
twentieth century, the eugenics movement in the United States asserted
that selective breeding could improve society by eliminating bad genes.
One result was that over 60,000 supposed undesirables, including the
mentally ill, criminals, drug addicts, the blind, orphans, and the homeless
were involuntarily sterilized. 84 PGD raises concerns that it would either: 1)
result in an “in” group of wealthy whites who deselect embryos with
disabilities or select embryos with favored characteristics, stigmatizing
those who cannot afford the technology or do not want to use it for other
reasons or 2) force or coerce those with a gene that results in disabled
offspring to deselect embryos with the gene, regardless of their preference,
if the law mandates such a policy. 85 Because the second possibility is most
in reproducing are able and willing to rear affected offspring, the costs of their
reproduction are unlikely to be sufficient to support a charge of reproductive
irresponsibility. Public action to prevent the birth of genetically handicapped
offspring by mandatory means is thus not justified.” Robertson II, supra note 20,
at 152.
83.

Scholars have even speculated whether children born with a disability that was
intentionally selected by the parents using PGD could sue their parents under tort
law. See Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort
Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 344 (2008)
(arguing that parents who use PGD to select embryos with disabilities – as
opposed to parents who may in the future be able to edit the DNA of embryos to
intentionally diminish children – cannot be sued because they “do not create a
legally cognizable injury to the born-alive child because of the Non-Identity
Problem” which dictates that there is no harm because the child would not
otherwise exist). But see Cohen I, supra note 81 (evaluating Smolensky’s
arguments and taking issue with her attempt to distinguish manipulation from
selection and to argue that the Non-Identity Problem prevents liability in the case
of PGD).

84.

Daar I, supra note 8, at 260-61.

85.

“As genetic screening increasingly enables individuals to manage their own health
by reducing genetic risk, we may see its wider incorporation into the health care
system. Using reprogenetics to select the traits of children may become more of
a general duty than a privileged choice. Widespread prenatal testing has already
assigned pregnant women primary responsibility for making the ‘right’ genetic
decisions.” DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS
RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 217 (2011) [hereinafter Roberts III]. “[I]n
her book exploring the public consequences of private decisions about
reproductive technologies, Lynda Beck Fenwick suggests readers ask themselves,
‘Are you willing to pay higher taxes to cover costs of government benefits for
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similar to the American history of eugenics—and thus more likely to
provoke great backlash and protest—scholars have focused on the first,
more invidious possibility.
Robertson argues that choosing not to have disabled children does not
inherently harm those who are currently disabled. As he states, “A policy to
prevent accidents that cause paraplegia does not harm existing paraplegics,
nor prevent us from supporting programs that make their lives easier.” 86
Robertson misses the point, however, that as the number of people who
are disabled declines, it is likely that supportive policies will decline,
particularly as the wealthy opt out of disabilities. If the wealthy can avoid
having disabilities, they are less likely to lobby for government funding for
the disabled or to contribute to charities that support the disabled.
If PGD can be used to screen out disabilities, it will inevitably stigmatize
individuals living with disabilities. As Robertson states:
Persons or families with disabled children have claimed that a policy
that encourages prebirth genetic deselection of persons with
disabilities is a public statement that the lives of the disabled are
worth less than those of the able-bodied. In addition, such a policy
reduces the number of persons with those disabilities, thus reducing
their political effectiveness . . . . In short, it engenders or reinforces
public perceptions that the disabled should not exist, making
intolerance and discrimination toward them more likely. 87

This is one plausible argument for either rejecting any expansion of the
use of PGD or allowing those who have genetic disabilities to perpetuate
their community through procreation, particularly given the United States’
murky past.

babies born with genetic defects, even when the parents knew of the high
likelihood or certainty such defects would occur.’ This question suggests that the
main objective of a state-supported reprogenetics program would not be to give
individuals more reproductive choices but to escape public responsibility for
disability-related needs . . . . In the future, the government may rely on the
expectation that all pregnant women will undergo genetic testing to justify not
only its refusal to support the care of disabled children, but also its denial of
broader claims for the public provision of health care. Without a right to basic
health care, more widespread use of genetic technologies could come at the
expense of public health.” Id. at 221.
86.

Robertson III, supra note 27, at 453.

87.

Id. at 453 (footnote omitted). Rao says “it should be (a) relatively easy for the state
to make the case for allowing PGD to select against a serious disease that would
cause death, (b) more difficult but still possible to justify PGD to select against a
‘disability’ that arguably decreases quality of life, such as deafness, but (c) much
more difficult, and perhaps impossible, to defend PGD to select for traits such as
sex, skin color, and sexual orientation that are disfavored solely because of
negative societal attitudes and prejudice.” Rao, supra note 13, at 1484 (footnotes
omitted).
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Judith Daar, however, argues against the idea that therapeutic PGD will
lead to a slippery slope back to eugenics. First, selective abortions serving
the same purpose have been and are available, but do not produce the
same fears. Second, although there are fears that parents will look to
produce the perfect child, everyone’s definition of perfect is different, as
shown by the parents who are willing to go to great lengths to have a child
who is deaf or has dwarfism. 88 I would add, though, that the parents who
seek to produce children with disabilities are, in part, reacting to a culture
of inequality; rather than defining their perfect child, they seek to defend
those considered diminished by growing their numbers.
Who defines what genes are good and bad? The answer is less obvious
outside of the example of genetic illness. Ensuring greater access to ARTs
results in a larger, more diverse population deciding which genes are
desirable and defending their communities. 89 In Section II, I look at how
recent disputes relating to PGD already have a negative impact on the
disabled and show that not enough attention has been paid to the creation
of a bifurcated system of procreation.

II.

PGD and the Courts

The most pressing questions before courts related to PGD are who
determines when and whether the embryos are implanted and what
happens when the wrong embryo is implanted (and, of course, what
constitutes the wrong embryo). Where courts once hesitated to consider
death an injury that resulted in a valid legal claim, the now-accepted
wrongful death claim has given way to attempts to gain recognition for a
wrongful life tort. 90
A significant amount of scholarship has addressed the growing demand
for recognition of wrongful life as a tort. 91 Much has been made about the
88.

Daar I, supra note 8, at 262-64 (“If our society is interested in preventing
intentional diminishment by birth parents, any regulatory scheme must be
directed at all prospective violators, not just those who require assistance to
procreate.”).

89.

See Roberts III, supra note 85, at 220 (“Although government welfare systems
have disdained facilitating childbearing by poor women of color by declining to
fund fertility treatments, they may treat prenatal genetic testing quite differently.
The very same thinking that promotes laws and policies that pressure these
women to have fewer children could promote laws and policies that pressure
them to have genetically screened children.”).

90.

Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 808 (1978) (“Although no longer shackled by
the conceptual difficulties formerly posed by a ‘wrongful death’ action, courts
have again been drawn toward the murky waters at the periphery of existing legal
theory to test the validity of a cause of action for what has been generically
termed ‘wrongful life.’”).

91.

See, e.g., Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 241 (2017)
(advocating for a new cause of action to address “reproductive injuries”); Wendy
F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 143-45 (2005) (acknowledging the existence of scholarly
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comparison between living a life with a disease or other genetic
abnormality and living a healthy life (or living no life at all if the comparator
is never having been born). 92 What scholars have not addressed is how
disputes over implanting the wrong embryos and increasing this tort’s
recognition would affect children born with the same genetic abnormalities
who were not conceived through ARTs. If something goes awry in the PGD
process and a child can recover because the wrong embryo was implanted,
this creates a stigma for those born with preventable diseases or conditions
whose parents either did not know about PGD or could not afford to utilize
it. 93 The children conceived through PGD could also recover the medical and
long-term care costs associated with the condition, even though they are
more likely to be the children of those who can afford to bear such costs.
The resolution of custody disputes relating to frozen embryos further
serves to stigmatize those without access to therapeutic PGD by
emphasizing the exceptional importance of having a genetic child and
creating the inference that the chance to have a healthy genetic child would
merit even greater legal protection. When the last chance to have a genetic
child can outweigh another person’s right not to be a parent, then the last
chance to have a healthy genetic child is likely to trump that right as well. 94
Dov Fox recently proposed a framework for addressing “reproductive
negligence” that recognizes that “[t]he harm is being robbed of the ability
to determine the conditions under which to procreate.” 95 Rejecting “a legal
system that treats heedlessly switched sperm, lost embryos, and
misdiagnosed fetuses not as misconduct that it protects against and
compensates victims for, but as misfortune that it tolerates and forces them
to abide,” 96 Fox outlines a unified legal claim to address the distinct harms
that negligence in assisted reproduction causes. 97 His article never
research supporting the recognition of the tort of wrongful life); Matthew
Reisman, Note, Harm and the Fluid Nature of Identity in Wrongful Life Cases
Involving Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 405, 407-09
(2014) (arguing that the wrongful life tort fits within the existing jurisprudence
regarding negligence torts).
92.

See, e.g., Hensel, supra note 91, at 161; Reisman, supra note 91, at 422; Alexander
D. Wolfe, Wrongful Selection: Assisted Reproductive Technologies, Intentional
Diminishment, and the Procreative Right, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 475, 489 (2008).

93.

See, Hensel, supra note 91; Marley McClean, Note, Children’s Anatomy v.
Children’s Autonomy: A Precarious Balancing Act with Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis and the Creation of “Savior Siblings”, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 837, 865 (2016).

94.

See infra notes 121, 124-31, 133-41 and accompanying text.

95.

Fox, supra note 91, at 155.

96.

Id.

97.

It is worth noting that, as Fox acknowledges, his proposed legal framework will
increase the cost of ARTs. He proposes an option such as damage caps “that
balances the freedoms that reproductive treatment enables against the injuries
that it can inflict.” Regardless, the additional liability will further reduce access
without additional insurance or government subsidies. See id. at 214.
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mentions the impact of this claim on those without access to the means to
effectuate their reproductive rights. Should they have a claim because they
have been “robbed of the ability to determine the conditions under which
to procreate?” 98 If not, any such legal right places those with access above
those without, an exacerbation of the current legal framework that I review
below.
The courts have not protected the right of those who cannot afford to
undergo therapeutic PGD to have similarly healthy genetic children. As
courts increasingly protect the rights of parents and children to deselect
embryos with unhealthy genes, access to reproductive rights should be a
key component of the jurisprudence.
A.

Tort Law

Approximately one in five IVF clinics “report errors in diagnosing,
labeling, and ‘handling samples or embryos.’” 99 As more people use
therapeutic PGD, lawsuits that argue negligence in cases where children are
born with a chromosome abnormality or a gene for a genetic disease in
spite of efforts to only implant healthy embryos will increase. Prior to the
development of PGD, these lawsuits focused on alleged negligence related
to the genetic testing of fetuses. Some lawsuits included claims using a tort
of wrongful birth and focused on the parents’ injury because they were
unable to abort the fetus since the disability or illness was not diagnosed in
utero. 100 Wrongful life actions on the child’s behalf allege that the
negligence “enabled the child to come into being, the operable injury is the
child’s life itself, with non-existence identified as the preferred
alternative.” 101 Generally, courts have favored wrongful birth claims but not
wrongful life claims, while scholars have typically defended both actions. 102
Courts identified two problems with recognizing a wrongful life cause
of action—the lack of a legal injury, and the lack of a proper remedy to put
the injured party in the same position he or she would have been in absent
98.

See id. at 177 (“[Reproductive decisions] vindicate not just decisional autonomy
(how freely she chooses), but also individual well-being (how well such outcomes
help her live).”).

99.

Id. at 152 (citation omitted).

100. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 809-14 (1978) (rejecting wrongful
birth claims in companion cases where plaintiffs, respectively, sued because
Becker had a child with Down’s Syndrome after she was not advised by her doctor
of the increased risk beyond age 35 or of the possibility of having an amniocentesis
test and Park had a second child after her doctor incorrectly told her polycystic
kidney disease is not hereditary); see also Fox, supra note 91, at 169 (“Wrongfulbirth actions fail to fully consider the separate and serious harm that victims of
reproductive negligence suffer. Their complaint is not that the child they received
is undesired or undesirable; it is that they have been denied the chance to decide
whether to gestate or parent.”).
101. Hensel, supra note 91, at 143.
102. Id.

286

Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017
Reproductive Selection Bias

the injury. In Becker v. Schwartz, the court argued that it lacked the
competence to decide “[w]hether it is better never to have been born at all
than to have been born with even gross deficiencies.” 103 Concerned not
only with a lack of precedent but with the implications of its decision, the
court continued, “Would claims be honored, assuming the breach of an
identifiable duty, for less than a perfect birth? And by what standard or by
whom would perfection be defined?” 104 The majority of jurisdictions
support wrongful birth claims, while only a few—California, New Jersey,
and Washington—allow wrongful life actions. 105
PGD has not to this point substantially changed the law in this area from
that which existed with other forms of prenatal screening. 106 Yet the
counterfactual differs in the case of PGD. In prior cases, the alternative,
absent improper genetic counseling and testing during pregnancy, was an
abortion. Wrongful life suits were rarely successful because the alternative
to the difficult life of the child with the chromosome abnormality or disease
that the parents sought to avoid through intervention was non-existence.
Now, the comparison can be the harm between implanting a healthy
embryo and the unhealthy embryo that was mistakenly implanted. 107
The transition between technologies can be seen in Paretta v. Medical
Offices for Human Reproduction. 108 In that case, the Parettas conceived by
creating an embryo from a carefully selected egg donor and Gerard
Paretta’s sperm. Although the egg donor was a known carrier of cystic
103. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812 (“Simply put, a cause of action brought on behalf of an
infant seeking recovery for wrongful life demands a calculation of damages
dependent upon a comparison between the Hobson’s choice of life in an impaired
state and nonexistence.”).
104. Id.
105. Hensel, supra note 91, at 161-62; see Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762-63 (1984)
(rejecting a wrongful life claim for general damages but allowing the recovery of
extraordinary medical expenses, stating that the decision “is not premised on the
concept that non-life is preferable to an impaired life, but is predicated on the
needs of the living”); Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 957-59 (1982) (finding that
“it is hard to see how an award of damages to a severely handicapped or suffering
child would ‘disavow’ the value of life or in any way suggest that the child is not
entitled to the full measure of legal and nonlegal rights and privileges accorded to
all members of society”).
106. See Kate Wevers, Note, Prenatal Torts and Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, 24
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257, 266-67 (2010).
107. Id. at 268 (“From the parents’ perspective, the counterfactual in a case of postpregnancy negligence is abortion. The counterfactual in a case of preconception
negligence is not conceiving. In a PGD context, however, the most likely
counterfactual is that the parents would have given birth at the same time to a
different child with the same genetic parents.”); Reisman, supra note 91, at 40708 (arguing that if one uses Parfit’s work on identity to assume that an embryo
lacks an identity, then selecting one embryo or another does not change the
identity of the child born but instead only the characteristics of that individual).
108. See Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 195 Misc. 2d 568 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2003).
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fibrosis, no one ever told the Parettas or tested Mr. Paretta. The baby was
conceived using IVF and born with the disease. Although Becker prevented
any recovery on the child’s behalf or for the parents’ emotional distress, the
Paretta court distinguished Becker because there was no claim in Becker
that the “physicians’ treatment caused the abnormalities in the child.” 109 In
Paretta, however, the plaintiffs alleged that the doctors “had a role in [the
child’s] genetic composition.” 110 Ultimately, though, the court refused to
take the next step and found that the child, “however, like any other baby,
does not have a protected right to be born free of genetic defects.” 111 Any
other conclusion would give children conceived with ARTs “more rights and
expectations than children conceived without,” 112 which is exactly the
concern with increasing recognition of a wrongful life tort.
Yet it seems unlikely that tort law will not find a way to compensate
couples who expect to produce a child free of genetic defects—because
that is what the medical service they are buying purports to provide—and
produce an unhealthy child as a result of negligence. The injury is apparent
if we assume that parents have a right to select particular offspring or
design their families in a way that fertility clinics advertise.
A review of recent cases addressing failures of PGD to produce healthy
children shows, however, that most courts are still reluctant to find that an
injury exists when parents conceive an unhealthy child. In Doolan v. IVF
America (MA), Inc., 113 the court found that a child conceived with cystic
fibrosis in spite of attempts to select a healthy embryo through PGD did not
have a negligence claims against the hospital. Rejecting what it viewed as a
wrongful life claim, the court stated:
[T]he essence of Thomas Doolan’s claim is not that the alleged
negligence of the defendants caused him to be born with cystic
fibrosis, but rather that the alleged negligence of the defendants
denied his parents the opportunity to choose not to conceive and
give birth to him. This is precisely the ‘fundamental problem of logic’
that the [Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts] sought to
avoid. 114
109. Id. at 575.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 576.
112. Id.
113. See Doolan v. IVF Am., Inc., No. 993476, 2000 WL 33170944 at *5 (Mass. Super.
Nov. 20, 2000).
114. Id. at *4; Even in California, which recognizes the tort of wrongful life, some judges
have found reasons to reject PGD tort claims. In Bergero v. University of Southern
California Keck School of Medicine, No. B200595, 2009 WL 946874 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 9, 2009), the parents of Gabriel Rubell Bergero attempted to use PGD through
a procedure called polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to deselect embryos with
Fabry disease. Although experienced with IVF, the University of Southern
California (USC) had only performed IVF for PCR once or twice before Gabriel’s
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As the use of PGD increases and its cost declines with increasing
efficiency and economies of scale, there will inevitably be more attempts to
expand recognition of the tort of wrongful life. The more reliable the
technology becomes, the more actionable negligence seems. With
recognition that a fertility clinic’s negligence resulted in the selection of the
wrong embryo and a large emotional and financial burden on the parents
and the child, the law will find a way to compensate for this injury.
One concern with the tort law claims is the effect they have on the
disabled, who are inevitably stigmatized by the idea that the disability
makes life so meaningless that the disabled embryo should never have been
selected or the parent should have been given the choice to abort the
child. 115 Although many scholars argue practically that there is a child who
needs care and these suits are only a method to obtain money to improve
the child’s quality of life, others argue that the harm to the disabled as a
group presents a larger problem. 116

case. Id. at *3. After testing, Gabriel’s parents agreed to implant two embryos that
they thought were female Fabry carriers since none of the embryos were Fabry
free and the symptoms are typically much less severe in women. Pregnancy with
a male child afflicted with Fabry resulted. Id. at *4.
The IVF specialist at USC, Dr. Richard Paulson, “conceded that Rubell might have
wanted to know about USC’s limited IVF for PCR experience. He also stated that
he understood a patient might want to know that USC’s IVF for PCR procedures
were performed eight to 10 months apart.” Id. at *11. The jury concluded,
however, that USC was not negligent, and the appellate court affirmed, because
in informed consent cases the physician’s failure to inform must cause the injury
to the plaintiff. A physician is only liable where a reasonable person would not
have gone forward with the treatment had she known the information. See also
Doe v. Illinois Masonic Medical Center, 297 Ill. App. 3d 240 (1998) (denying
plaintiffs access to hospital documents where they participated in a hospital
program designed to reduce the incidence of cystic fibrosis through PGD and,
subsequently, gave birth to a baby girl with cystic fibrosis).
115. See Hensel, supra note 91, at 144 (“Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits may
exact a heavy price not only on the psychological well-bring of individuals with
disabilities, but also on the public image and acceptance of disability in society.
Rather than focusing on a defendant’s conduct, as in a traditional tort action, both
wrongful birth and wrongful life suits ultimately focus on the plaintiff’s disability,
a status that is at least partially a societal construction.”).
116. See, e.g., id. (“Any benefits secured by individual litigants in court are thus taxed
to the community of people with disabilities as a whole, placing at risk, in the drive
for individual compensation, the gains secured by collective action and identity.”).

289

Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017
Reproductive Selection Bias
B.

Family Law

As the use of IVF has increased, so have disputes over frozen
embryos, 117 particularly in the event of divorce. 118 Either couples do not
consider before creating embryos what should happen in the event of
unforeseen circumstances, or courts refuse to enforce their agreements. 119
PGD will likely change this body of law because it increases the degree of
attachment and, at times, desperation that those fighting for the right to
use the embryos will feel. Those utilizing IVF and therapeutic PGD to create
embryos have, on average, spent more money trying to conceive than those
using IVF alone. Because these prospective parents discard or deselect
unhealthy embryos, it frequently takes more IVF attempts to create healthy
embryos to implant. This results not only in a more time-consuming process
but also in more discomfort for the woman producing the eggs and in
anxiety for the couple.
In addition, the question remains whether and how courts will factor
into the analysis the possibility that, if the parent seeking to use the
embryos is also the one with the genetic condition that caused the couple
to use PGD and is not granted the right to implant the embryos, he or she
may then be more likely to have a child through natural methods to avoid
the additional expense and effort. This could result in sick babies instead of
healthy babies. I first review current frameworks for deciding embryo
disputes and then argue that an increase in the use of therapeutic PGD will
result in greater use of the balancing test and further serve to emphasize
the value and importance of babies created using PGD.
Courts have utilized different frameworks for deciding embryo
disputes: (1) a contractual framework, (2) a contemporaneous mutual

117. Courts differentiate between the embryo and pre-embryo stages of fertilization.
“The pre[-]embryo comes into existence with the first cell division and lasts until
the appearance of a single primitive streak, which is the first sign of organ
differentiation. This [primitive streak] occurs at about fourteen days of
development.” See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 262, amended sub nom. In re
of Marriage of Litowitz, 53 P.3d 516 (Wash. 2002) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). This article will use the term
embryo to refer to both embryos and pre-embryos.
118. See, e.g., Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce & Family Law
Contracting: A Model for Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 387-81
(2013); Mark P. Strasser, You Take the Embryos But I Get the House (and the
Business): Recent Trends in Awards Involving Embryos Upon Divorce, 57 BUFF. L.
REV. 1159, 1159 (2009); Angela K. Upchurch, The Deep Freeze: A Critical
Examination of the Resolution of Frozen Embryo Disputes Through the Adversarial
Process, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 395, 396 (2005).
119. See Michael T. Flannery, “Rethinking” Embryo Disposition Upon Divorce, 29 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 233, 233 (“This problem arises either because couples
fail to expressly state their intent for disposition upon divorce through contract,
or public policy renders such contracts unenforceable.”).

290

Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017
Reproductive Selection Bias

consent framework, and (3) a balancing framework. 120 Because many
fertility centers require clients to decide what will be done with the
embryos before they are created, particularly in the event of divorce, courts
frequently enforce these agreements using a contractual framework, which
typically prevents the use of the embryos after a separation. 121 Even
scholars who use contractual principles of interpretation to argue against
the use of embryos after divorce where an agreement is made ex ante to
allow the use of the embryos after divorce make an exception, however, for
a party who has no other chance to conceive. 122
Under the contemporaneous mutual consent framework, both parents
must agree to implant the embryos for one parent to use them, regardless
of what any previous written agreements state on the disposition of those
embryos. Only Iowa endorses this framework. 123 In re Marriage of Witten 124
applied the contemporaneous mutual consent framework, refusing to
enforce an embryo-storage agreement signed by Tamera and Arthur Witten
but also refusing to allow Tamera Witten to use the embryos to conceive a
child. Looking not just at precedent but also at legal scholarship, the Iowa
Supreme Court found that “[t]he contractual approach and the
contemporaneous mutual consent model share an underlying premise:
‘decisions about the disposition of frozen embryos belong to the couple
120. Id. I take no position on debates over what should happen to the embryos if not
implanted. Currently unregulated, that is a subject beyond the scope of this paper.
121. See Litowitz, 48 P. 3d at 268-71 (enforcing agreement with fertility center to thaw
and discard embryos five years after cryopreservation unless parties mutually
agreed to extend the contract in spite of later changes between the biological
father and intended mother of the embryos); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180-82
(N.Y. 1998) (enforcing parties’ prior consent form to donate embryos to research
in the event of divorce and noting that “[a]dvance agreements as to disposition
would have little purpose if they were enforceable only in the event the parties
continued to agree”); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (concluding
in dicta that ex-ante agreements on disposition of embryos at certain
contingencies should be enforced unless superseded by later mutual agreement);
cf. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057-59 (Mass. 2000) (finding husband’s consent
to wife’s control of embryos after separation on the fertility center’s consent form
invalid because incomplete but stating that agreement would be enforceable
regardless for public policy reasons); Dara E. Purvis, Expectant Fathers, Abortion,
and Embryos, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 330, 335 (2015). But see Alex M. Johnson, Jr.,
The Legality of Contracts Governing the Disposition of Embryos: Unenforceable
Intra-Family Agreements, 43 SW. L. REV. 191, 193-96 (2013) (arguing that these
agreements should be viewed as gratuitous promises based on the marital
relationship existing at the time that are unenforceable in the event of divorce).
122. See, e.g., Johnson, Jr., supra note 121, at 203 (finding that reliance may justify
enforcing agreements where “the inability of one of the parties to exercise their
reproductive ability in the future without the use of the gametic material that is
the subject of the disputed agreement, which fact is known to the other
contributor of gametic material at the time of contribution” (citation omitted)).
123. Purvis, supra note 121, at 335.
124. In Re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
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that created the embryo, with each partner entitled to an equal say in how
the embryos should be disposed.’” 125
The difference between the two frameworks is the question of when
the parties must consent. Citing research on frequent changes in decisions
about embryo disposition before and after creation, the Iowa court chose
the contemporaneous mutual consent approach because it requires that
neither partner remove the embryos from cryostorage and use them in any
way unless the other partner consents at the time of removal. 126 The Iowa
court noted that it
think[s], however, that it would be against the public policy of this
state to enforce a prior agreement between the parties in this highly
personal area of reproductive choice when one of the parties has
changed his or her mind concerning the disposition or use of the
embryos. 127

Courts have generally held that one parent’s right not to be a parent
outweighs the other parent’s right to have a baby when using the third
framework, a balancing test. 128 Notably, however, there is “a different
balance when the stored pre-embryo may be the mother’s last chance to
be a genetic mother . . . [and] the circumstances overcome the right not to

125. Id. at 777 (quoting Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous
Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV.
55, 81 (1999)).
126. Id. at 778 (“Although this model precludes one party’s use of the embryos to have
children over the objection of the other party, the outcome under the contractual
approach and the balancing test would generally be the same.” (citation
omitted)).
127. Id. at 780-81; see id. at 783 (“The practical effect will be that the embryos are
stored indefinitely unless both parties can agree to destroy the fertilized eggs.
Thus, any expense associated with maintaining the status quo should logically be
borne by the person opposing destruction.” (citation omitted)).
128. See Johnson, Jr., supra note 121, at 222-24 (noting that courts have refused to
enforce contracts agreeing to the disposition of embryos after separation where
one party no longer wants to be a parent because of the facts surrounding the
creation of these agreements).
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be a parent.” 129 This exception was enforced in Reber v. Reiss, 130 where the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that Lynn Reiss’s right to procreate
outweighed her ex-husband, Howard Reber’s, right not to procreate where
it was almost certainly her only chance to be a biological parent and likely
her only chance to be a parent at all given her health history. Reiss delayed
treatment for breast cancer for several weeks after diagnosis to undergo
IVF and create embryos with Reber, knowing that cancer treatments would
substantially impede her fertility. The parties subsequently divorced. Reiss
sought to implant the embryos over Reber’s objection, and, with no
previous agreement as to disposition of the embryos in the event of
divorce, the court awarded the embryos to Reiss. The court stated that
“unless and until our legislatures decide to tackle this issue, our courts must
consider the individual circumstances of each case.” 131
In another, well-publicized battle, 132 the Appellate Court of Illinois
awarded custody of embryos to Karla Dunston over the objections of her
129. Purvis, supra note 121, at 331 (“[I]ndeterminacy allows for the relative importance
of male and female expectational parental interests to play a greater role in the
court’s analysis.”); see Szafranski v. Duston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 515 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.
2013) (“Courts applying the balancing approach have noted that a party’s inability
to have a child weighs in his or her favor.” (citation omitted)); J.B. v. M.B., 783
A.2d 707, 716 (N.J. 2001) (holding that ordinarily the right not to procreate should
trump the right to procreate and denying husband custody of embryos for
donation where he remained fertile with the caveat that the court reached no
conclusion on the outcome where “a party who has become infertile seeks use of
stored pre-embryos against the wishes of his or her partner”); Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (finding that husband’s interests in avoiding
procreation outweighed wife’s interest in donating embryos after her remarriage
following divorce but stating in dicta that “[t]he case would be closer if Mary Sue
Davis were seeking to use the pre-embryos herself, but only if she could not
achieve parenthood by any other reasonable means”); I. Glenn Cohen, The Right
Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1193 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen
II] (“While it seems that the interest in avoiding unwanted genetic parenthood is
greater than the general interest in access to particular genetic material, one
might think that the balance between the interests is different when not having
access to the pre[-]embryos makes it impossible to have any genetic children at
all.”); cf. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000) (refusing to enforce agreement
allowing wife to implant embryos after separation where couple already had two
children).
130. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. 2012).
131. Id. at 1142 (overruling husband’s objections where wife promised not to seek child
support and agreed to allow husband to be as involved as he wanted in the child’s
life and striking down his argument that he never intended to procreate with his
wife given the nature of IVF).
132. See, e.g., Kim Bellware, Her Last Chance For a Baby. His Fight Against Forced
Fatherhood. The Court Must Decide., HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 26, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/22/illinois-frozenembryo_n_6348920.html; Angie Leventis Lourgo & Bonnie Miller Rubin, Court
Gives Frozen Embryos to Chicago Woman Over Ex-Boyfriend’s Objection, CHI. TRIB.
(June 12, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ctembryos-court-ruling-met-20150612-story.html; Madeleine Schwartz, Who Owns
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ex-boyfriend, Jacob Szafranski. 133 In the first appeal in the case, 134 the court
found, after reviewing precedent, that embryos in dispute should be
disposed of (1) according to any ex ante agreement of the parties or (2) by
weighing the parties’ interests in the absence of an agreement. After the
lower court on remand awarded the embryos to Dunston, the appellate
court affirmed.
Dunston and Szafranski had been dating for a few months, and neither
“expected their relationship to result in marriage” when Dunston was
diagnosed with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. 135 At that time, Dunston delayed
treatment to undergo IVF and Szafranski agreed to donate sperm to create
embryos instead of having her use donor sperm. Although the couple
signed an informed consent agreement, the agreement did not provide for
disposition in the event that the couple separated and indicated only that
the fertility clinic would adhere to any separate agreement of the parties. 136
The parties visited a lawyer and discussed both co-parenting and sperm
donation contracts but never executed an agreement. 137 After the couple
broke up, Szafranski confirmed in an email that the choice of using the
embryos was Dunston’s, but he subsequently changed his mind and
demanded that she not use the embryos. 138
Szafranski conceded that the parties reached an oral agreement prior
to signing the fertility clinic’s informed consent and creating the embryos.
The court held that Szafranski intended at the time the contract was created
to help Dunston produce embryos for the purpose of having her own
biological children and the parties did not contemplate giving him a veto
over the use of the embryos. 139
The court also found that the application of a balancing test supported
awarding the embryos to Dunston. Her last chance to have a biological child
Pre-Embryos?,
NEW
YORKER
(Apr.
28,
http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/who-owns-pre-embryos.

2015),

133. Szafranski v. Duston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1133 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 1230 (2016).
134. Szafranski v. Duston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 515 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2013) (“In addition to
holding that agreements between the parties should be honored, we further hold
that where there has been no advance agreement regarding the disposition of
pre-embryos, ‘then the relative interests of the parties in using or not using the
pre-embryos must be weighed.’ Although we acknowledge that this is not an ideal
way to resolve a dispute implicating reproductive rights, we note that ‘what is
even worse . . . is to give a possibly antagonized ex-spouse the power to either
block parentage or to name the price that potential parentage will cost.’”
(citations omitted)).
135. Szafranksi, 34 N.E.3d at 1137.
136. Id. at 1138.
137. Id. at 1139.
138. Id. at 1141.
139. Id. at 1149.
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outweighed his concerns over the stigma of conceiving a child in this
manner. 140 In weighing heavily Dunston’s desire to have a biological child,
the court “decline[d] to make a judicial determination that alternative
methods of parenthood offer Karla an acceptable substitute to biological
parenthood.” 141
The exception made here to the general right not to procreate when
balancing interests in embryo-custody disputes is easily analogous to
disputes likely to arise as the prevalence of therapeutic PGD increases. In
those cases, denying a parent with a gene for a genetic illness the chance
to use embryos that have undergone PGD could result in: (1) that parent
not being able to have a genetic child because of the risk of passing on the
gene during natural conception, depending on age and resources to
undergo further IVF and PGD to create more embryos; or (2) an increased
risk that the parent seeking to use the embryos will conceive naturally and
pass on the gene because of the desire to have a genetic child, again,
depending on age and resources to undergo further procedures. In the first
outcome, the balance is similar to the cases discussed above. The right to
have a genetic child weighs heavily. In the second outcome, which assumes
that the parent seeking to use the embryos has the alternative of natural
conception, courts will have to weigh whether there is a right to have a
healthy genetic child and whether that right outweighs another person’s
right not to procreate. Courts have weighed heavily the right to be a genetic
parent, and this indicates that they will likely put a thumb on the scale again
for the right to be a genetic parent of a healthy child. Yet, this runs the risk
of giving those who use ARTs more rights than those who do not, since
there is no right to a healthy child or right to be a healthy child.
Another question is how courts should weigh the interest of society in
producing healthier children. If a parent with a gene for a genetic illness
loses the chance to reproduce through therapeutic PGD and instead
decides to conceive naturally in spite of the risk of passing on the gene,
society will bear at least part of the cost of the child’s illness through
increased medical costs and decreased productivity as an adult. Should the
courts be concerned with these social costs?
In The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, Glenn Cohen argues that
“many of these authorities have erred by conceiving of a monolithic right
not to procreate, and we should instead recognize a bundle of rights having
multiple possible sticks, consisting of a right not to be a gestational, legal,
and genetic parent.” 142 Obviously, the right to be a gestational parent
belongs only to a woman, while the other two sticks can belong to either

140. Id. at 1162 (“Karla testified that she was ‘devastated’ upon learning that she would
lose her fertility and thought about how she wants to have a child ‘with part of’
her father, who passed away when she was five years old.”).
141. Id. at 1163.
142. Cohen II, supra note 129, at 1121.
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men or women. 143 Cohen asserts that the right not to be a genetic parent
would be based on “unwanted ‘attributional parenthood,’ a harm that
comes from the social assignment of the status of parent to the provider of
genetic material that persist notwithstanding the fact that the legal system
has declared him or her a nonparent.” 144
To my point, Cohen questions whether society has distinct interests
that should affect what law determines the outcome of these disputes. 145
While he gives the example of what would happen if there were evidence
that children born over one genetic parent’s objection were “1000 times
more likely to commit violent crimes compared to the population at
large,” 146 my question here is what would happen if there were evidence
that discarding the embryos—valuing the right not to be a genetic parent
over the right to be a genetic parent—resulted in children born to the
partner who sought genetic parenthood that were 1000 times more likely
to have a serious genetic illness or chromosome abnormality. Cohen also
questions how that balance changes if the person seeking to implant the
embryos already has one or more genetic children. 147
The tendency for courts to make an exception to the right not to
procreate due to the importance of conceiving a genetic child results in an
inference that the greater stakes in cases where a parent may otherwise
conceive an unhealthy child will cause courts to increasingly favor the rights
of those seeking to conceive through therapeutic PGD. Regardless of
whether courts increasingly recognize the wrongful life tort, and I believe
that they will, an emphasis on the rights of those who seek to conceive
through therapeutic PGD inevitably stigmatizes the lives of those who are
born with genes for genetic illnesses because their parents did not want to
or could not afford to conceive using this procedure. In the next section, I
argue that there is an administrative law solution to the disparity
attributable to the high cost of PGD.

III.

Access for “Other Groups”

Assuming it is not repealed, the ACA presents an opportunity to expand
access to therapeutic PGD and other ARTs. The statute’s goal of expanding
access to health insurance and its antidiscrimination framework fit nicely
with my arguments above about the need to expand access to reproductive
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1125.
145. Id. at 1133 (“That would give society a reason to oppose that pre[-]embryo’s
coming into being even if we assume that coming into being was in the pre[]embryo’s best interest--although that reason might still be defeated, for
example, by society’s countervailing interest in protecting procreative
autonomy.”).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1195.
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rights. These rights could also be incorporated under the essential health
benefit provisions.
Scholars discussing the ACA’s antidiscrimination provision have focused
on whether it meets the challenge of providing a basic, equivalent level of
health insurance to all, albeit within a two-track system of public and
private benefits. 148 As discussed further below, Jessica Roberts has focused
on the need to shift from an antidiscrimination framework to a fundamental
rights framework to decide which benefits are required to provide everyone
with meaningful access to health insurance. 149 She reserves the question of
which benefits should be included on this list and who should decide. Here,
I argue that ARTs such as IVF and PGD to screen out embryos with a genetic
predisposition for illnesses that either result in early death or significantly
impair quality of life should be included on that list of essential health
benefits in spite of concerns about the overemphasis on genetic ties and
the slippery slope to eugenics.
I argue that Section 1557 of the ACA should be considered a positive
right in this situation to avoid the disparate impact that wealth has on
healthcare access. The Secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS”),
now or in the next administration, should consider the desire of lowerincome individuals to produce healthy children when defining essential
health benefits under the ACA. Although my proposed solution does not
impact those covered by Medicaid, a subject for another article, it is a start
at closing an important gap in our healthcare system and enforcing equal
reproductive rights for all.
A.

A Positive Right under the ACA

Statutory antidiscrimination provisions in health insurance
demonstrate the tension between a private system that must rely on
efficiency and focus on cost to profit and the desire of government to fairly
care for all citizens. They suppress the use of traits to forecast policy losses
by prohibiting insurance “carriers from relying on characteristics that are

148. See Sidney D. Watson, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: Civil Rights, Health
Reform, Race, and Equity, 55 HOW. L.J. 855, 857-58 (2012) (“Because the ACA
continues the tradition of Medicaid for the poor and a variety of private insurance
offerings for wealthier Americans, it has the potential to perpetuate America’s
dual track medical care with one system serving mostly white patients with private
insurance and a different system for poorer, mostly minority patients with
Medicaid. In fact, the ACA may exacerbate this two-tier system by creating a third
tier of moderate-income Americans, half of whom are people of color, who obtain
their health insurance through the new Exchanges using federal tax credit
subsidies. By maintaining multiple sources of health insurance, the ACA may serve
to reinforce and further segregate patients along racial lines.”).
149. Jessica L. Roberts, “Healthism”: A Critique of the Antidiscrimination Approach to
Health Insurance and Health-Care Reform, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1159, 1197 (2012).
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socially suspect, thus preventing insurers from exacerbating or trading on
inequalities that exist outside of the insurance system.” 150
Fairness concerns dominate in the context of genetic discrimination. 151
Adverse selection concerns are muted because the predisposition for a
genetic illness typically involves a long time-horizon and a probability of
acquiring the illness rather than a certainty (although dominant traits like
the gene for Huntington’s disease manifest one-hundred percent of the
time when the gene is present). Most health insurers are concerned with
short-term risks because participants may switch health insurance plans
many times. 152
As Wendy Mariner notes, however, “[c]ommercial health insurance
policies occupy a somewhat unusual space among lines of insurance. They
cross the boundary between conventional insurance and service contracts,
because they cover both fortuitous losses, like accidental injuries and heart
attacks, and predictable ‘losses,’ such as preventive services.” 153 The
definition of preventive services is shifting with the growing wave of genetic
selection and the future of genetic engineering. 154 Whether a positive right
to reproductive liberty is located in the Constitution, the ACA’s
antidiscrimination provision, or under the ACA’s essential health benefits
requirement is less important than recognizing that the model for health
insurance is not changing with increasing coverage of ARTs–only the
150. Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue & Daniel Schwarcz, Towards a Universal
Framework for Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 3 (2014-15)
(examining how state insurance antidiscrimination laws generally balance
“efficiency” and “fairness”); The article notes that employer-sponsored health
insurance assuages the concern about adverse selection by spreading the risk and
cost of caring for employees in poor health or with a “genetic predisposition to
illness” among the larger, more diverse group. Id. at 28-29.
151. Id. at 32 (“Genetic discrimination in the context of health, life, and disability
insurance immediately evokes Nazi Germany and its obsession with promoting the
reproduction of more ‘genetically desired’ people and eliminating ‘genetically
defective’ individuals. Under this worldview, Nazis first forced those with
Huntington’s disease to be sterilized and later murdered them in extermination
facilities. The United States also has a history of forced sterilization based on
supposed genetic defects.” (citations omitted)).
152. Id. at 33. This is also one reason why health insurers are reluctant to fund
expensive preventive care like therapeutic PGD to reduce or eliminate the risk of
members acquiring genetic diseases. Although an insurer enrolls the parents
before birth (when the costs for such treatment are incurred) and the child at
birth, it is unlikely to continue to insure the child later on in life when the disease
would manifest (and the cost savings from prevention are felt).
153. Wendy K. Mariner, The Picture Begins to Assert Itself: Rules of Construction for
Essential Health Benefits in Health Insurance Plans Subject to the Affordable Care
Act, 24 ANNALS HEALTH L. 437, 451 (2015) (citations omitted).
154. See Tetsuya Ishii, Germ Line Genome Editing in Clinics: The Approaches, Objectives
and Global Society, 16 BRIEFINGS FUNCTIONAL GENOMICS 1 (2015) (describing how a
new technique called CRISPR that allows genome editing is being utilized in ARTs
for prevention of diseases as well as genetic enhancement).

298

Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017
Reproductive Selection Bias

definition of preventive care is. Because I think it unlikely that courts will
find that failing to provide everyone with IVF and PGD is a violation of the
rights to equal protection and substantive due process, I focus on the choice
between the ACA’s antidiscrimination provision and its essential health
benefits requirement. The antidiscrimination provision is broad and permits
discrimination against those with genetic illnesses by proxy, and I therefore
argue that the Secretary should use statutory discretion to include
therapeutic PGD among the EHBs.
1.

Antidiscrimination

Section 1557 of the ACA states that individuals may not “be excluded
from participating in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under, any health program or activity” that receives federal
funding—including credits and subsidies—or is administered by a
government entity on the “grounds prohibited under title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975, or section 794 of title 29.” 155 Those grounds
include race, sex, age, and disability. 156
The ACA’s antidiscrimination provision regulates the content of
insurance. And significantly, the ACA targets both intentional discrimination
and de facto discrimination, or “facially neutral practices with a
discriminatory impact.” 157 The final rule provides specifically that the HHS
Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) “interprets section 1557 as authorizing a
private right of action for claims of disparate impact discrimination on the
basis of any of the criteria enumerated in the legislation.” 158 Although the
OCR will adjudicate violations of section 1557 under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act, individuals can sue directly under section 1557. 159

155. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2010) (citations omitted). The statute makes clear that this
provision is not designed to limit or supersede the cited statutes. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 18116(b) (2010).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (race, color, and national origin); 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) (sex);
42 U.S.C. § 6101 (age); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2014) (disability).
157. Mastroianni, supra note 7, at 172.
158. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31376, 31440
(May 18, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92).
159. 45 C.F.R. § 92.301 (2016); see Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-cv-2037
(SRN/FLN), 2015 WL 1197415, at *11 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015) (“[I]t appears
Congress intended to create a new, health-specific, anti-discrimination cause of
action that is subject to a singular standard, regardless of plaintiff’s protected class
status. Reading Section 1557 otherwise would lead to an illogical result, as
different enforcement mechanisms and standards would apply to a Section 1557
plaintiff depending on whether plaintiff’s claim is based on her race, sex, age, or
disability. For instance, a plaintiff bringing a Section 1557 race discrimination claim
could allege only disparate treatment, but plaintiffs bringing Section 1557 age,
disability, or sex discrimination claims could allege disparate treatment or
disparate impact.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)); Timothy Jost, HHS
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The question remains whether courts will favor disparate impact claims
under the ACA. 160 Regardless, disparate impact litigation has a troubled
history in Title VII employment discrimination claims and other areas of the
law, and it is arguably inconsistent with equal protection under the
Constitution. 161 Thus, disparate impact litigation may not be the tool to
protect a negative right to be free from affirmative—though
unintentional—discrimination that it was previously considered, let alone a
place to find a positive right to health insurance opportunities. 162
The question of whether “programs that endeavor to remediate the
harms done to a subordinated or disadvantaged class fundamentally differ
from those that create or perpetuate subordination” and, therefore, do not
violate equal protection, 163 differs greatly in the context of health
insurance. First, the costs of providing increased opportunities for equality
among different races and for women are dispersed among a much larger
number of people. In Ricci v. DeStefano, white and Hispanic firefighters
(“Firefighters”) brought suit against the city of New Haven, Connecticut
(“City”) under Title VII after the City refused to certify the results of a
promotion examination due to a statistical disparity between white
candidates’ results minority candidates’ results. 164 The Firefighters claimed
Issues Health Equity Final Rule, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 14, 2016),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/05/14/hhs-issues-health-equity-final-rule/.
160. Govind Persad, Priority Setting, Cost-Effectiveness, and the Affordable Care Act, 41
AM. J.L. & MED. 119, 160 (2015) (noting the recent trend of the Supreme Court to
disfavor disparate impact claims under a variety of antidiscrimination statutes and
querying whether the ACA will be treated similarly).
161. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585 (2009) (holding that “before an employer
can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or
remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong
basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails
to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 20-24
(2006) (arguing for a structural approach, such as the disparate impact doctrine,
to employment antidiscrimination law); Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief
Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of
Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 454-63 (2005) (discussing how the
disparate impact doctrine moved forward antidiscrimination law by making
unintentional, as well as intentional, discrimination illegal and the history of
difficulties that the disparate impact theory has faced); Michael Selmi, Was
Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 732-45 (2006)
(documenting the limitations of the disparate impact doctrine).
162. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening
Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 73, 157-65 (2010); Cedric
Merlin Powell, Harvesting New Conceptions of Equality: Opportunity, Results, and
Neutrality, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 255, 259-61 (2012).
163. Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2157, 2205
(2013) (arguing that the disparate impact theory of liability and the Equal
Protection Clause can, and should, be reconciled).
164. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 561-62.
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that refusal to certify the results constituted discrimination against them on
the basis of their race. 165 The City claimed that if they had certified the
results they would have faced liability under Title VII “for adopting a
practice having a disparate impact on minority firefighters.” 166 The Court
held that an action such as the City’s refusal to certify the results “is
impermissible under Title VII unless the employer can demonstrate a strong
basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it would have been liable
under the disparate-impact statute.” 167 The Court found that the City could
not meet that threshold standard and, therefore, had violated Title VII. 168
In attempting to effectuate reproductive liberty, however, any increased
costs for health insurance companies required to cover PGD could be offset
by cost savings resulting from preventing genetic illnesses or short-term
government subsidies, or by small general premium increases.
Second, except for perhaps a minimal increase in health insurance
premiums, no one is harmed by providing additional health insurance
opportunities to those with genes for genetic illnesses. No one loses
insurance because of increasing coverage for therapeutic PGD any more
than they lose coverage when an expensive new medication or medical
procedure is covered under those plans. Even if the costs are greater than
expected, and insurance companies must increase premiums or cut back in
other ways to provide these benefits, this is the business of health
insurance. No one would dare suggest that insurance companies not treat
the genetic illnesses when they manifest because it is too costly. Why
should coverage for preventive care be any different? 169
Jessica Roberts asserts that the antidiscrimination framework adopted
under the ACA is simply incompatible with a for-profit health insurance
industry. The ACA, in spite of good intentions, still burdens the unhealthy
by using health proxies instead of explicit considerations of health status. 170
Roberts discusses how this “healthism”—or discrimination based on health
status—becomes illicit discrimination under the ACA and other recent
statutes prohibiting such discrimination. 171 Antidiscrimination frameworks
165. Id. at 562.
166. Id. at 563.
167. Id.
168. Given the Court’s holding, it did not reach the question of whether the City’s
action violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
169. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31377
(“Covered entities should bear in mind the purposes of the ACA and Section 1557
– to expand access to care and coverage and eliminate barriers to access – in
interpreting requirements of the final rule.”).
170. Roberts, supra note 149, at 1161-62.
171. Id. at 1171-72 (“If health status joins the catalogue of forbidden traits, health
insurers are undoubtedly discriminators . . . . But what makes one kind of
differentiation acceptable and another morally reprehensible--and perhaps
legally actionable--is a complicated question and one that relies heavily on
historical and cultural context. As one scholar has explained, ‘Discrimination is not
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typically prevent decision makers from considering protected traits, forcing
them into blindness and representing a negative right—the right to be free
from differentiation due to a suspect categorization. 172 An
antidiscrimination framework transforms acceptable risk allocation and
profit maximization by insurers into unacceptable discrimination. 173 This
occurs because the traditional methods the health insurance industry uses
make insurance expensive or unavailable to those who need its services the
most. 174
The antidiscrimination frameworks of the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”), and the ACA fail to properly protect the
unhealthy. HIPAA does not require that group health insurers offer any
particular benefits or limit premiums, keeping insurance out of reach for
the sick. 175 Under GINA, Congress prohibited discrimination based on
genetic information, in spite of adverse-selection issues, but the statute
favors the healthy because it excludes “discrimination on the basis of a
manifested genetic condition once it is diagnosable by other means.” 176
Once a genetic condition results in symptoms that make the disease
identifiable through means other than genetic testing, GINA offers no
protection. 177
The ACA prohibits several means of discriminating directly against the
unhealthy but uses instead proxies that continue to favor the healthy. The
one thing, but many.’” (footnotes omitted)). Some have compared denying health
insurance to the sick to discrimination based on race. Id. at 1175-76 (“Putting
health status on par with race constitutes an important rhetorical move, as race
is widely regarded as the most invidious basis for discrimination.” (footnote
omitted)).
172. See id. at 1178.
173. Id. at 1165 (“Profitable insurance thus relies on accurate, calculable risks . . . . As
a result, health insurers have historically employed medical information, in
addition to demographic and behavioral factors like sex, age, and smoking, when
determining coverage and setting premiums.” (footnotes omitted)).
174. Id. at 1167.
175. Id. at 1182 (“While group health insurers cannot discriminate against individuals
in the group, they can still make group-wide decisions based on health status, such
as the kind of benefits or coverage to provide or the amount of a premium to
impose. Thus, if one member of a group develops a serious illness, it can affect
the health insurance of all group members.” (footnote omitted)).
176. Id. at 1184 (“GINA defines ‘genetic information’ as the results of an individual’s
genetic tests, the results of an individual’s family members’ genetic tests, and the
manifestation of a disease or disorder in an individual’s family.” (footnote
omitted)).
177. Id. at 1185 (“Consequently, the statute does not protect the results of a test that
detects a manifested condition--even if that condition has a genetic basis. Thus, a
test that diagnoses Huntington’s disease, a genetically based disorder with a onehundred percent correlation between the genetic variant and the condition, is not
a ‘genetic test’ for insurance discrimination purposes.” (footnote omitted)).
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statute prohibits pre-existing condition exclusions. 178 It prevents insurers
from discriminating in setting premiums for the individual and small-group
markets, but it permits insurance companies to consider family size,
geographic location, age, and tobacco use. 179 And although the ACA
prohibits discrimination based on health status, it allows premiums for
employer-provided plans to fluctuate by up to thirty percent if an employee
completes a wellness program. 180
The use of proxies to determine premiums particularly disadvantages
the poor. Considering where a person lives results in harm to the urban and
rural poor because they have more health problems and fewer health
facilities. Community rating—requiring insurers to charge the same
premiums for all health policies sold within a particular area—could harm
these groups depending on how the boundaries are drawn. 181 Similarly,
since those with lower incomes use tobacco at higher rates, increasing
premiums based on tobacco use hurts those with lower socioeconomic
status. 182 Congress made trade-offs to continue the private system of health
insurance that exists alongside our public benefits. A continuation of private
health insurance requires insurers to keep costs down by increasing costs
for high-risk participants, now that they cannot be excluded from coverage
entirely under the ACA’s pre-existing condition and lifetime maximum
coverage limitations. 183
Roberts suggests a shift from an antidiscrimination framework to a
fundamental rights framework that bridges equal protection and
substantive due process. 184 The focus shifts from discrimination based on
178. Id. at 1187.
179. Id. at 1188 (“While individual—and small—group insurers may no longer explicitly
use past or current health status in determining premiums, they may still vary
their rates based on these four factors, which may, in fact, serve as crude proxies
for health status.” (footnote omitted)).
180. Id. at 1188-90 (“Although the law is not ‘healthist’ on its face, it still favors the
same individuals who benefited under the preceding system. Within the individual
and small-group markets, the new rating criteria act as proxies for health and may,
therefore, perpetuate existing disparities. Within the large-group market,
wellness programs could likewise adversely affect the sick, who may be unable to
participate equitably . . . . Although the law succeeds from an antidifferentiation
standpoint, it fails by producing discriminatory outcomes . . . . To borrow language
from Title VII doctrine, the new policies will likely have a ‘disparate impact’ on the
basis of health-related factors.” (footnotes omitted)).
181. Id. at 1192 (“Importantly, under the new system, an income-based subsidy will be
available to help offset the cost of health insurance, yet particular lower-income
populations might still experience disadvantage--most notably the ‘near poor.’”).
182. Id. at 1193.
183. Id. at 1164.
184. Id. at 1197-98 (“[Kenji Yoshino] explains that a growing ‘pluralism anxiety’ has
pushed the Supreme Court to move away from acknowledging equality concerns
framed as group-based identity claims in favor of those presented in terms of the
more expansive doctrines of liberty and universally held fundamental rights. Thus,

303

Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017
Reproductive Selection Bias

health status to the lack of “sufficient health-insurance coverage for all
people.” 185 The next step is figuring out what health benefits are required
under this right to health insurance and who should decide what benefits
need to be included. 186 The discussion moves from who to cover to what
services to cover, which is precisely what the ACA’s EHB provisions require.
The reason that I argue the ACA’s antidiscrimination provision is not the
place to locate a positive right to ARTs is because there is “no logical
stopping point.” 187 Remediating all differential outcomes in utilization of
health services, which is what a robust disparate-impact jurisprudence
under the ACA would require, would take more resources than the current
health insurance system can offer. 188 And few would argue that this was the
intent of the ACA, particularly without greater congressional funding
attached.
2.

Essential Health Benefits

Forcing health insurers to cover the cost of IVF and PGD to deselect
embryos with genes for grave genetic illnesses because it is an essential
health benefit is compatible with the practices of private insurers. First,
depending on which genes are included on the list, the percentage of the
population affected is small, particularly since some will choose not to
undergo the procedure when having children, even if it is free. 189 Second,
insurers will see cost savings because of the reduction in the manifestation
of these genetic illnesses in later years. The reason insurers have not
substantive due process claims--situated in a rights-based frame--may encompass
concerns related to inequality and group subordination.” (footnotes omitted)).
185. Id. at 1198.
186. Id. at 1199 (“The answers to these questions are never simple. Creating a baseline
for health insurance inevitably excludes certain kinds of coverage, thereby leaving
some individuals with less than optimal access to health care.”).
187. Rosenthal, supra note 163, at 2208 (“To avoid the demands of strict scrutiny, one
might instead conclude that any preference favoring women or minorities is
constitutionally unobjectionable, but a jurisprudence willing to uphold any kind of
racial preference favoring minority groups has no logical stopping point--precisely
the reason the Court has rejected preferences designed to remediate societal
discrimination.” (footnote omitted)).
188. As Sidney Watson writes, “Broad statements prohibiting facially neutral policies
and practices that have an unjustified disparate racial impact do not give health
insurers, health care providers, the agency, or courts sufficient guidance on how
to strike the proper balance between equity concerns and economic and profit
motives.” Watson, supra note 148, at 860.
189. See About Cystic Fibrosis, CYSTIC FIBROSIS FOUND., https://www.cff.org/What-isCF/About-Cystic-Fibrosis/ (last visited July 26, 2016) (estimating that .0001% of
the U.S. population is afflicted with Huntington’s disease and .00009% is afflicted
with Cystic Fibrosis); Stephanie Liou, Population Genetics and Huntington’s
Disease, HUNTINGTON’S OUTREACH PROJECT EDUC. STAN. (Oct. 26, 2010),
http://web.stanford.edu/group/hopes/cgi-bin/hopes_test/population-geneticsand-hd/#the-frequency-of-hd.
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implemented coverage already, given the cost savings, is that they may
never see those cost savings. If insurers spend money on therapeutic PGD
and produce a child without genetic illness, the child may be covered by a
different insurer when the cost savings are realized. Yet if all insurers are
required to cover therapeutic PGD, they will all see the cost savings later,
even if the children selected through PGD that they paid for are not the
healthy children or adults they later cover and see the cost savings from.
The ACA thus presents a collective action fix to an insurance problem.
The ACA requires health insurance plans to cover, without cost sharing,
preventive health services, and it specifically provides for such care and
screenings for women and children. 190 The statute states:
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or
individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum, provide
coverage for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements for(1) evidence-based items or services that have in effect a rating of “A”
or “B” in the current recommendations of the United States
Preventive Services Task Force; . . .
(3) with respect to infants, children, and adolescents, evidenceinformed preventive care and screenings provided for in the
comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and
Services Administration.
(4) with respect to women, such additional preventive care and
screenings not described in paragraph (1) as provided for in
comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and
Services Administration for purposes of this paragraph. 191

The statute also prohibits annual or lifetime limits on per-beneficiary
health benefits by an insurance plan for any “essential health benefits
under section 18022(b) of this title.” 192 The Secretary has discretion to
190. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(2)-(3) (2012); This provision of the ACA has been the
subject of recent litigation in which the mandates for preventative services in the
form of contraceptives created under the provision were challenged as violating
religious freedom. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
(upholding an as-applied challenge to the contraceptive mandate as substantially
burdening the exercise of religion of the companies forced to provide health
insurance coverage for such services).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(1)-(4) (footnote omitted).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 (“(a) Prohibition (1) In general – A group health plan and a
health insurance offering group or individual health insurance coverage may not
establish--(A) lifetime limits on the dollar value of benefits for any participant or
beneficiary; or (B) except as provided in paragraph (2), annual limits on the dollar
value of benefits for any participant or beneficiary . . . . (b) Per beneficiary limits –
Subsection (a) shall not be construed to prevent a group health plan or health
insurance coverage from placing annual or lifetime per beneficiary limits on
specific covered benefits that are not essential health benefits under section
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define “essential health benefits” with a few limitations. 193 Essential health
benefits must include, among other enumerated items, maternity and
newborn care and preventive and wellness services. 194 In addition, essential
health benefits must be “equal to the scope of benefits provided under a
typical employer plan, as determined by the Secretary.” 195 Yet, among other
“[r]equired elements for consideration” when defining essential health
benefits, “the Secretary shall . . . (C) take into account the health care needs
of diverse segments of the population, including women, children, persons
with disabilities, and other groups.” 196
My argument here is that there is room for an administrative-law
solution to the socioeconomic and moral quandary I presented above with
the Baker and Smith families. The ACA’s focus on providing preventive
health services, particularly for women and children, which includes
classifying them as essential health benefits not subject to per-beneficiary
annual or lifetime limits, allows the Secretary to include IVF and PGD to
screen out genetic diseases among such preventive health services for
women and children. In addition, the requirement that the Secretary
consider the “health care needs of diverse segments of the population,
including . . . other groups” 197 is an avenue for regulations that consider the
health needs of the poor, which–though admittedly including many other
urgent needs–surely includes the need not to pass preventable genetic
diseases to their children. 198
18022(b) of this title, to the extent that such limits are otherwise permitted under
Federal or State law.”).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(D), (I).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(2)(A) (“The Secretary shall ensure that the scope of the
essential health benefits under paragraph (1) is equal to the scope of benefits
provided under a typical employer plan, as determined by the Secretary. To inform
this determination, the Secretary of Labor shall conduct a survey of employersponsored coverage to determine the benefits typically covered by employers,
including multiemployer plans, and provide a report on such survey to the
Secretary.”).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(C).
198. See Jason Potter Burda, When Condoms Fail: Making Room under the ACA Blanket
for PrEP HIV Prevention, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 171, 227 (2015) (arguing that HHS
should require health plan administrators to consider the needs of subpopulations
at high risk for HIV, such as men who have sex with men, by covering PrEP (oral
HIV pre-exposure prophylactic medication)); Daar I, supra note 8, at 265 (“[T]he
current limited access to PGD should be addressed not by denying the available
technology to the few who can afford it, but by ensuring wider access for all.
Concern for the genetic health of one’s children is not a value limited to parents
with resources; it is a universal value that can only be fully realized in a society
that devotes its scarce resources to providing the most up to date technologies to
everyone.”); Sarah E. Gage, Note, The Transgender Eligibility Gap: How the ACA
Fails to Cover Medically Necessary Treatment for Transgender Individuals and How
HHS Can Fix It, 49 NEW ENG. L. REV. 499, 511-13 (2015) (arguing that section
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This provision, section 18022(b)(4)(C), requiring that the Secretary
decide EHBs by looking in part to the needs of diverse subpopulations,
means that insurance carriers’ calculations cannot simply include the most
cost-effective benefits or those that have the largest benefit to the
population overall because “appropriately considering the needs of
subgroups requires deviating from the strict pursuit of total benefit.” 199 A
key question moving forward is “which ‘diverse segments’ are relevant.” 200
The ACA does not address infertility treatment coverage, nor do any
subsequent HHS regulations under the statute. HHS allows states to
incorporate their own EHB standards into the insurance plans they regulate,
and fifteen states mandate some amount of coverage for infertility
treatments. 201 While some studies have shown that requiring private
insurance to cover fertility treatments does not increase the use of those
treatments significantly, 202 this is likely because the population covered by
private insurance (particularly pre-ACA) is wealthier and already has access
to ARTs. This evidence shows that demand is being suppressed by the high
cost of ARTs for those without insurance coverage.
Many will be concerned with the government mandating coverage for
fertility treatments. I therefore move next to addressing the implications of
mandating such coverage for therapeutic PGD and, importantly, the
implications if we do not adopt such coverage.
B.

Lack of Access as Eugenics

My argument in this article is subject to three main, not unrelated,
critiques: (1) many or most of those who cannot afford PGD, and ARTs more
broadly, do not want access, and requiring access through health insurance
will coerce them into utilizing the procedures, (2) providing access to PGD
18022(b)(4)(C) of the ACA is an avenue to increase gender-confirming care for
transgender people, although other provisions harm this effort).
199. Persad, supra note 160, at 147; Id. at 166 (The ACA’s provisions “are potentially
dangerous: to the extent that they promote a view that considerations of cost and
effectiveness are completely outweighed by the gain of even a moment of life,
they threaten the possibility of achieving the healthcare system we need--one
that supports public health while reining in rising costs . . . . Taking seriously the
challenge that the ACA’s provisions pose requires a health care system that does
justice to the complexity of our values.”).
200. Id. at 147 (“[F]actors . . . such as race, color, national origin, gender, gender
identify, and sexual orientation, are somewhat less likely to produce debate” than
factors “clearly relevant to medical practice, such as age and disability.” (footnote
omitted)).
201. Mastroianni, supra note 7, at 153-54 (“Specifically, [ ]HHS proposed a policy in
December 2011 that provided states with ‘the flexibility to select . . . benchmark
plan[s]’ based upon typical insurance coverage plans within the state. On February
27, 2015, [ ]HHS renewed this policy through 2017.” (second and third alterations
in original) (footnotes omitted)).
202. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible
Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 37 (2008) [hereinafter Daar III].
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for one illness or trait creates pressure to provide access to PGD for another
illness or trait, and providing access to one ART creates pressure to provide
access to another ART, in an endless line-drawing exercise, and (3)
increasing access to and use of therapeutic PGD will stigmatize those with
disabilities or illnesses in society. None of these concerns outweigh the
growing reality that lack of access to PGD and ARTs generally is becoming a
form of reverse eugenics in this country, or the “new eugenics” as Judith
Daar calls it in her recent book, 203 but I explore each in detail below before
asserting that these critiques are allowing an invidious model of eugenics
to take hold.
Dorothy Roberts argues that maintaining genetic ties is a focus of
whites, while government policies discourage black women from having
children. 204 If genetic ties are important mainly to whites, is it racist to
encourage or coerce the genetic tie in minorities through subsidies? In the
face of a grave, genetic illness, there is the choice to test and abort any
affected fetus, to adopt children, to use a sperm or egg donor, or to not
have children at all. Why choose this policy of subsidized assisted
reproductive technology?
My answer once again comes back to choice. First, we have no accurate
way of knowing what the poor, including minorities, want in this situation
because they have no access and, therefore, no real choice. 205 Racial bias
203. Daar II, supra note 77. Daar argues that “the true eugenic effect of ART is not in
its use but in its deprivation.” Id. at 192. She compares the effects of numerous
economic and social barriers to ART to historical eugenic policies that prevented
supposed undesirables from reproducing and concludes that the impact is similar
because both the old and new forms of eugenics “depriv[e] them [of] the
opportunity to reproduce in unison with more favored populations.” Id.
204. Roberts I, supra note 1, at 944 (“The monumental effort, expense and
technological invention that goes into the new reproduction marks the children
produced as especially valuable. It proclaims the unmistakable message that white
children are precious enough to devote billions of dollars towards their creation.
Black children, on the other hand, are the primary object of welfare reform
measures designed to discourage poor women from procreation.”); Roberts III,
supra note 85, at 213 (“At a time when wealthy white women have access to
technologies designed to produce genetically screened babies, an assortment of
laws and policies discourage women of color from having babies at all.”). But see
Janet L. Dolgin, Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes, and Family, 41 AKRON L. REV.
347, 364 (2008) (arguing that as “nontraditional families-of-choice” have
proliferated, genetic ties have become “an essential component of personal and
group identity” (footnote omitted)). The possibility remains, then, that genetic
ties are increasingly prevalent as a way to bind nontraditional families. Genetic
ties may be more of a focus for whites in that case simply because minorities lack
access to assisted reproduction. It is possible that Roberts has the flow of
causation wrong, and increased use of ARTs is not a result of the importance of
genetic ties to whites but instead a result of the increasing number of
nontraditional families who increasingly value those ties.
205. See Daar III, supra note 202, at 38-43 (discussing higher rates of infertility among
minorities but lower rates of treatment due to lower socioeconomic status and
correspondingly lower rates of health insurance and higher rates of physician bias
and distrust of the healthcare system). Although research has focused on gaps in
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operates both explicitly and implicitly in healthcare to affect the diagnoses
and treatments minorities receive. As Ruqaiijah Yearby writes, “The largest
disparity in accessing quality health care and health status in the United
States remains between African-Americans and Caucasians.” 206 It is difficult
to gauge the preferences of racial minorities who have a gene for a serious
illness and cannot afford PGD without giving them access. While it is
possible that some will then use the procedure out of a sense that society
demands they produce “healthy” children and they will be ostracized if they
do otherwise, it is more coercive to deny access to a choice than to subsidize
it. 207
Viewing funding for PGD as coercive requires an assumption that the
baseline is a lack of funding for assisted reproduction and an unequal
distribution of wealth within society. 208 If, instead, the unequal distribution
of resources is conceived of as a result of laws that concentrate wealth
among a small percentage of the population and particularly disadvantage

the utilization rates of fertility treatments between whites and minorities, without
equal funding, it is pure speculation to assume that their interest level differs.
206. Yearby, supra note 6, at 1285-87 (footnote omitted) (“Racial bias in health care
operates on three different levels: interpersonal, institutional, and structural.
Interpersonal bias is the conscious (explicit) and/or unconscious (implicit) use of
prejudice in interactions between individuals. [Gives example of doctors making
different treatment decisions that result in higher mortality rates for AfricanAmericans than Caucasians.] . . . Institutional bias operates through
organizational structures within institutions, which ‘establish separate and
independent barriers’ to health care services. [Gives example of hospital closures
in African-American communities.] . . . Finally, operating at a societal level,
structural bias exists in the organizational structure of society, which ‘privile[ges]
some groups . . . [while] denying others access to the resources of society,’
including health care. [Gives example of health care based on ability to pay instead
of needs of patients.]” (fifth, sixth, and seventh alterations in original) (footnotes
omitted)).
207. But see Roberts III, supra note 85, at 221 (“Making citizens responsible for
managing their health at the genetic level reflects the shift of responsibility for
public welfare from the state to the private realms of market and family . . . .
Today, state genetic testing programs do not force citizens to participate. Instead
the government and corporate sectors rely on the sense of obligation individuals
feel to control their own health at the genetic level. Turning people into ‘gene
carriers’ concentrates responsibility on them to manage their own genetic
predispositions, shifting the spotlight away from state responsibility for ensuring
healthy living conditions.”).
208. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 895 (“[T]he existing distribution is not natural and
does not provide a neutral baseline; it resulted in part from government decisions;
efforts to improve the lot of the disadvantaged fall comfortably within the police
power, should not be treated as impermissibly partisan, and may even be
constitutionally compelled, especially where there is racial discrimination on the
face of a statute.”).
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minorities, then funding is merely an effort to get us back to the baseline of
equality and remove the coercive effects of such maldistribution. 209
It is, of course, possible that increased public funding will not result in
increased use of therapeutic PGD by the poor and minorities who currently
use ART in far lower numbers than wealthy whites, even if they can afford
the procedures. 210 There is no doubt, however, that public funding is
necessary to overcome financial and social barriers to equal access to this
treatment. As Dorothy Roberts writes, “It is hard to imagine a multimillion
dollar industry designed to create Black children.” 211 The government,
therefore, has a responsibility to ensure that society does not entrust the
creation of healthier children to private industry.
The second critique, related to the first, argues that because covering
therapeutic PGD essentially requires drawing lines between acceptable and
unacceptable uses of PGD and favored or subsidized ARTs and disfavored
ARTs, no line should be drawn at all, no subsidies should be given, or all use
of the technology should be prohibited. This critique is informed by the
question of where to draw the line for the negative right to be free from
interference with reproductive liberty. Samuel Bagenstos writes that “we
confront a classic Legal Realist baseline problem: all choices are made under
an array of constraints, so the government will always have some plausible
argument for regulating to promote choice. And the notion of autonomy,
by itself, will not provide a basis for rejecting any such regulation.” 212 He
concludes that the normative question is: “What kinds of (publicly or
privately imposed) constraints are we going to treat as rendering a choice
unfree)?” 213 Subsidizing certain uses of PGD and certain ARTs overall will
inevitably favor those now free choices. Society must weigh which traits it
is ethically and financially appropriate to subsidize deselecting. Lines are
always being drawn in health insurance coverage.
On the last critique, disability rights advocates have joined pro-life
activists in their opposition to expanding access to therapeutic PGD out of
fear that it would stigmatize those with disabilities or illnesses in society.
They argue that the practice incorporates “discriminatory attitudes about
disability, and that any ‘choice’ will not be a free one in light of social
209. Id. at 917-18 (discussing Lochner era’s continuing effect on common law because
it assumes that the “current distribution of benefits and burdens along racial lines
is simply ‘there’”).
210. Roberts II, supra note 9, at 245 (“Yet there is a stark racial disparity in the use of
new reproductive technologies that seems to result from a complex interplay of
financial barriers, physician referrals, and cultural preferences.”).
211. Id. at 246.
212. Bagenstos I, supra note 79, at 442 (footnotes omitted) (discussing position of
disability rights advocates on abortion regulation).
213. Id. at 451-52 (acknowledging that financial constraints may effectively prevent a
poor woman from exercising her right to an abortion but stating that “[i]n a
capitalist society . . . the government has no general affirmative obligation to
provide for its citizens” (footnote omitted)).
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pressures” including physician bias and social stigma. 214 While those who
are not disabled often believe that the disabled lead a tortured and
abnormal existence, most of the disabled do not view their lives that way,
or would not in the absence of the social stigma. 215
Disability rights activists have spoken out frequently against the use of
genetic testing to selectively abort fetuses with genetic mutations that
result in illness or disability. Their concern is the fulfillment of “the
eugenicist’s dream of eliminating disabilities by eliminating people with
disabilities.” 216 If the number of disabled people decreases, their voice and
push against discrimination is reduced, and it becomes easier to
continuously isolate them and reduce their numbers further in society. 217
I share the concern that deselecting embryos (in the case of PGD) with
a gene that results in a high likelihood of disability at birth or later in life will
stigmatize the disabled and is the product of incomplete information and
physician bias at times. Yet, if we assume that the wealthy will continue to
use this procedure for this purpose (a likely assumption), failing to subsidize
PGD for the poor results in a disabled population that is stigmatized by
society’s views on both disability and poverty. It seems more likely to me
that prejudice against the disabled will grow as the wealthy opt out and the
disabled population is increasingly poor. If poor parents want to opt out as
well, it should not be acceptable for society to place the weight of the moral
quandary inherent in deselecting for disabilities on their shoulders. The
argument that we should not subsidize therapeutic PGD because it will
stigmatize the disabled is only valid if we prohibit the use of PGD for
everyone. 218
Historically, “[e]ugenicists believed that most social problems were
caused by hereditary faults of those afflicted by the problem, and they
eventually sought to eliminate these societal problems through selective
214. Id. at 428-37 (discussing disability rights critique in the examples of withholding
treatment from infants with disabilities and assisted suicide).
215. Id. at 435-37 (“Disability rights advocates have long argued that the proper
remedy for such stigmatization is not medical treatment to eliminate disabilities-and certainly not medical interventions to eliminate people with disabilities--but
is instead guarantees of civil rights to change the hostile and inaccessible aspects
of society.” (footnote omitted)). This argues in favor of education as part of true
reproductive liberty instead of banning PGD; But see Vuko Andrić & Joachim
Wündisch, Is It Bad to be Disabled? Adjudicating Between the Mere-Difference and
the Bad-Difference Views of Disability, 9 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 1, 1 (2015).
216. Bagenstos I, supra note 79, at 439 (footnote omitted).
217. Id. at 439-41 (noting that the prescription of many disability rights advocates is
not the elimination of abortion, however, but requiring physicians to provide
unbiased information about the lives of the disabled and their value to those
seeking to abort fetuses with genetic abnormalities).
218. Perhaps some balance is found in comparing my argument here in favor of the use
of therapeutic PGD in a way that will arguably stigmatize the disabled with Jessica
Roberts’s view that the ACA is a civil rights law for the disabled. See Jessica L.
Roberts, Health Law as Disability Rights Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1963, 1964 (2013).
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breeding.” 219 Therapeutic PGD and other ARTs targeted to screen out
genetic disease and chromosome abnormalities target narrow illnesses and
conditions and seek to eliminate them. Instead of blaming more complex
social problems on genetics, the technology seeks to blame Huntington’s
disease (for example) on the gene that produces the disease and eliminate
its manifestation in the population. The question is not only whether it
means a return to our eugenic past to engage in this practice and seek to
eliminate disabilities, 220 but also what it means to eliminate bad genes only
in the wealthy, white population this time. We have given rise to a
movement for reverse eugenics.
Judith Daar writes about the practical “barriers” that create a “modernday eugenics,” including cost and race. 221 She argues that:
[s]o long as ART remains a private good that, without legal
consequence, is withheld from the least well-off among us, birth by
assisted conception will take on a eugenic quality – one that rivals the
goals of the earlier movement to repress breeding by those deemed
unworthy of dynastic participation in the human race. 222

I assert here that lack of access is oppressive and needs to be viewed as an
affirmative harm.
The failure to find a positive right to this technology is allowing current
income inequality to grow in a way that many feel uncomfortable discussing
because of its ableist origins. If we cannot prohibit wealthy whites from
using this technology or decide that we should not do so because of the
good that the technology achieves or the importance of reproductive
choice, then the poor—including a disproportionate share of minorities—
will be made to bear the cost of caring for those with genetic illnesses or
chromosome abnormalities.
219. Daar III, supra note 202, at 78-80 (discussing terrible “legacy of state control over
procreation” through forced sterilization and its impact on ART).
220. See, e.g., Mary B. Mahowald, Aren’t We All Eugenicists?: Commentary on Paul
Lombardo’s “Taking Eugenics Seriously”, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 219, 220 (2003);
Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Children: Our Eugenics
Past-Present, and Future?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 125, 130 (2003); Michelle Oberman,
Thirteen Ways of Looking at Buck v. Bell: Thoughts Occasioned by Paul Lombardo’s
Three Generations, No Imbeciles, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 357, 358 (2010).
221. Daar III, supra note 202, at 81 (“But isn’t the deprivation of reproductive
opportunity just as coercive as any formal, explicit directive to forgo offspring? . . .
The coercive eugenic nature of ART barriers comes into sharp focus upon
inspection of the individuals whose access to assisted conception is most
suppressed--poor, minority, unmarried individuals who historically lack political
and economic power. These are the very persons, who like their early twentieth
century counterparts, are not terribly welcome in a society that measures human
improvement by its ability to coalesce around a set of homogeneous
characteristics.”).
222. Id.; see Daar II, supra note 77, at xiv (“This exercise of procreative deprivation is
eugenic to the core.”).
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Conclusion
Unequal access to healthcare is nothing new. 223 However, economic
inequality has, in recent months, moved up on our country’s list of
priorities. With that change comes new openings for combatting inequality
in access to healthcare. The next step is to fix the access problem in ART,
with the most immediate need in the area of therapeutic PGD. 224 The time
has come for health-law scholars and courts to declare that there is no
liberty in reproductive rights without equal access.

223. MEHLMAN & BOTKIN, supra note 24, at 61-62 (“An examination of our health care
system shows that, regardless of how unpopular it may be to give people
preferences on the basis of their social status, we are willing to tolerate a
significant degree of unequal access to health care based on wealth.”).
224. Daar I, supra note 9, at 271-72 (“For parents who use PGD to avoid passing a
deleterious genetic disorder to a child, their quest is not one for perfection, but
rather for normalcy within health parameters. Choosing not to birth children with
serious illnesses seems consistent with natural parental instincts to protect
offspring from pain and suffering. To view the use of PGD for medical selection as
a desire to enhance our children beyond that which human nature currently
contemplates is to suggest that parents who seek cures for their ailing children
wrongfully challenge the natural order of life. If we cannot imagine denying
parents the right to seek cures and therapies for their ailing children, why should
we imagine a system for denying parents the right to ensure the health of their
children before they are born?”).
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